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Abstract
Fingerprints have been the most widely used in authentication systems due to
their ability to fulfil technical and implementation requirements. Over the last two
decades, research in fingerprint-based authentication systems has seen tremendous
growth. Recently, fingerprints have been used to authenticate people remotely and
allow them access to a system. For instance, smart mobile devices have been devel-
oped with fingerprint scanners for use in authentication. However, the fingerprint-
capture sensor is cracked easily using false fingerprint features constructed from a
glass surface. Fake fingerprints, which can be easily obtained by attackers, could
cheat the system and this issue remains a challenge in fingerprint-based authenti-
cation systems. In such systems, if fingerprint samples are compromised, the whole
authentication system is compromised. Thus, a mechanism that can validate the
originality of fingerprint samples is desired. Watermarking techniques have been
used to enhance the fingerprint-based authentication process, however, none of
them have been found to satisfy genuine person verification requirements. There-
fore, specific watermarking mechanisms are still needed to verify the authenticity of
fingerprint image. This thesis focuses on improving the verification of the genuine
fingerprint owner using watermarking techniques. Four research issues are being
addressed to achieve the main aim of this thesis.
The first research task was to embed watermark into fingerprint images col-
lected from different angles. In verification and identification systems, an acquired
fingerprint image (sample image) is compared with another fingerprint image, called
the ’template’, which was stored in the database at the time of enrolment. The
displacements and rotations of fingerprints images collected from different angles
lead to different sets of minutiae. In this case, the fingerprint-based authentication
system operates on the ’close enough’ matching principle between fingerprint sam-
ples and template. A rejection of genuine samples can occur erroneously in such
cases. The process of embedding watermarks into fingerprint samples could make
this worse by adding spurious minutiae or corrupting correct minutiae. Therefore,
a watermarking method for fingerprint images collected from different angles is
proposed.
Second, embedding high payload of watermark into fingerprint image and pre-
serving the features of the fingerprint from being affected by the embedded wa-
termark is challenging. In this scenario, embedding multiple watermarks that can
be used with fingerprint to authenticate the claimed person is proposed. In the
developed multi-watermarks schema, two watermark images of high payloads are
embedded into fingerprints without significantly affecting minutiae.
Third, the robustness of the watermarking approach against image processing
operations is important. The implemented fingerprint watermarking algorithms
have been proposed to verify the origin of the fingerprint image; however, they are
vulnerable to several modes of image operations that can affect the security level of
the authentication system. The embedded watermarks, and the fingerprint features
that are used subsequently for identification and authentication purposes, can be
damaged. Therefore, the current study has evaluated in detail the robustness of
the proposed watermarking methods to the most common image operations. In
particular, the watermarking methods were evaluated under image compression,
resizing or scaling, sharpening, rotation, cropping, gaussian and salt-and-pepper
noises.
Fourth, mobile biometrics are expected to link the genuine user to a claimed
identity in ubiquitous applications, which is a great challenge. The use of fingerprint-
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enabled apps on mobile devices has increased in recent years. Touch-based sensors
for capturing fingerprints have been incorporated into mobile phones for user iden-
tity authentication. However, an individual fake fingerprint cracking the sensor
on the iPhone 5S is a warning that biometrics are only a representation of a per-
son, and are not secure. To make thing worse, the ubiquity of mobile devices
leaves much room for adversaries to clone, impersonate or fabricate fake biometric
identities and/or mobile devices to defraud systems. Therefore, the integration of
multiple identifiers for both the capturing device and its owner into one unique
entity is proposed. A new watermarking algorithm is developed here to coin the
identities of two entities (a mobile device and its owner) into a fingerprint image
acquired by a mobile camera. The effects of different image processing operations
on a watermarked touchless fingerprint image are investigated in detail.
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Chapter1
Introduction
The growing ubiquity of smartphones has accelerated their use in Internet appli-
cations. The daily usage of mobile devices with Internet access has enabled online
businesses to use them for identification purposes. For instance, a mobile device
can receive a short message verification code called one-time password which is used
for online banking authentication [2]. However, there are two main drawbacks in
this authentication method. First, the verification code can be illegally observed.
Second, even if the authentication process is performed successfully, it is not pos-
sible to ensure it was the genuine user that submitted the required information.
Therefore, a reliable authentication method is required to verify the genuineness of
the claimed identity (e.g. a biometric-based identity).
Biometrics refers to human characteristics that identify individuals based on
their anatomical (e.g. fingerprint) or behavioural (e.g. voice) characteristics [3].
As it has several applications in authentication [4], biometrics has received in-
creasing attention from researchers in recent years. Biometric-based authentication
systems are more efficient than traditional authentication systems such as token- or
knowledge-based information; which can be forgotten, stolen or lost [5]. They are
more user friendly and convenient as there is no need to remember or carry any extra
information. Thus, it is one of the best ways to link a user to a claimed identity. Of
the range of biometric modalities (i.e. iris, fingerprint, hand vein, face and voice),
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
fingerprints have been the most widely used in authentication systems due to their
uniqueness, immutability and convenience [6]. Although fingerprint-based authen-
tication systems have several advantages over traditional authentication systems,
they also suffer several drawbacks when they are used for remote authentication
[7]. First, fake fingerprint images can be constructed easily using several spoofing
approaches to accessing a system [8]. Second, the original fingerprint sample used
in one application can be tampered with; therefore, all other applications using the
same sample may have problems due to the fact that fingerprint features cannot be
replaced or cancelled.
To overcome the above issues, watermarking can be used to verify the authentic-
ity of a fingerprint sample [9]. This thesis investigates different digital watermark-
ing techniques to prove the genuineness of fingerprint image. However, different
challenges have been addressed in the proposed fingerprint watermarking methods.
In the fingerprint-based authentication system, the acquired fingerprint image and
the template in the database are collected from different angles. The difference in
presentation angles is occurred due to the different direction of the finger with the
sensor. The matched minutiae in both images are few because the overlap area
between different impressions of the same finger is limited [10]. The process of
watermarking can either add false minutiae points or can conceal minutiae points
which in turn adds significant distortions between different impressions of the same
finger. Therefore, the first challenge is to retain the features of fingerprint im-
ages that accommodate the uncertainty of different fingerprint impressions while
embedding watermarks. Second, embedding high payload into fingerprint image
conflicts with the other basic watermarking requirements such as imperceptibility,
robustness and preserving fingerprint minutiae from being affected by the embed-
ded watermark. The third challenge is to integrate multiple identifiers of different
entities into color fingerprint images captured by mobile camera is challenging.
This is because the quality and the extracted minutiae of the touchless fingerprint
images are lower compared to touch-based images. The embedded watermark can
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corrupt their features significantly.
In this thesis, different fingerprint watermarking schemas are proposed to prove
the genuineness of fingerprint image. The effects of the embedded watermarks on
fingerprint image are investigated in detail and the number of unaffected and af-
fected minutiae due to watermarking process are used to demonstrate the level of
similarity between original and watermarked images. Also, the robustness against
common image operations is evaluated in details. Furthermore, the effect of wa-
termarking on camera-based colour fingerprint images used for authentication pur-
poses is explained.
1.1 Research Questions
Although fingerprints represent people uniquely, they are not secret and it is possi-
ble to cheat the system using fake fingerprint samples. Recently, fingerprints have
been adopted by smartphones to control access to the phone. To ensure that fin-
gerprint samples is genuine, a number of watermarking methods are proposed in
this thesis and assessed for their effect on fingerprint minutiae. The main goal of
this thesis is to answer the following research questions:
1. How can we watermark fingerprint images collected from different angles
without significantly affect minutiae?
This research question focuses mostly on developing a watermarking method
for fingerprint images used in fingerprint verification systems. In particu-
lar, the influence of the embedded watermarks on minutiae is preserved
insignificant. In fingerprint-based verification systems, the matching algor-
ithm compares fingerprint sample with template stored in database where
both are collected from different angles. The extracted set of minutiae from
both images are not exactly same, therefor, matching algorithm performs
’close enough’ matched features. Embedding watermark into sample image
could affect the matching process between two sample and template images.
2. How to embed high payload of multiple watermarks into fingerprint image?
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In general, the watermark payload that can be embedded into an image has
limited size. It is difficult to embed multiple watermarks of large sizes into
fingerprint image without affect the other watermarking requirements such
as imperceptibility, robustness and preserving minutiae from being affected.
The overall aim of this question is to embed enough information about the
fingerprint owner into the fingerprint image to verify the authenticity of the
watermarked image.
3. How to compare the proposed watermarking algorithms in terms of robust-
ness to image processing operations?
The process of image watermarking usually leads to loss of quality and there-
fore it is crucial to estimate the extent of quality degradation and the per-
ceived affect. Fingerprint watermarked images can be subjected to a num-
ber of image operations including noise, rotation, resizing, compression and
cropping. It has become apparent that any minor geometric damage to the
watermarked fingerprint image can affect the watermark extraction process.
This is because the embedded watermarks and fingerprint features that form
the basis of authentication systems can be damaged. Therefore, the robust-
ness of watermarking schemes to common image processing operations and
geometric attacks is essential for the systems.
4. How to integrate camera-based colour fingerprint image with other multiple
identifiers to prevent fake fingerprint access in mobile devices?
Integrating mobile device with fingerprint image is expected to link the gen-
uine user to a claimed identity in ubiquitous applications. A watermarking
technique can be applied to integrate fingerprint image with multiple iden-
tifiers for the claimed person and mobile device into a unique entity. This
unique entity has high security strength, which could be used for both iden-
tity identification and authentication.
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1.2 Original Contributions
This research makes a number of original contributions to the body of fingerprint
image watermarking knowledge and implementation. This thesis explores differ-
ent watermarks on fingerprints from different perspectives based on a wide range
of experiments. Three watermarking methods based on Discrete Cosine Trans-
form (DCT), Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) and Dual-tree Complex Wavelet
Transform (DTCWT) are utilized in this thesis to embed watermark into finger-
print image. Each technique has its own advantages for watermark embedding. The
DCT allows an image to be divided into different blocks, making it much easier to
embed the watermark into selected blocks. The DWT has been used for image wa-
termarking because of its excellent multi-resolution characteristics that are similar
to the presentation of the human visual system (HVS). Fingerprint images typi-
cally consist of parallel lines (ridges) at varying angles, the DTCWT is the best
candidate when used to preserve ridge angles. Based on this broad investigation,
the effects of the embedded watermarks on fingerprint minutiae are investigated.
The main contributions of this dissertation include:
1. Embedding watermark into fingerprint image to accommodate the
uncertainty of fingerprint impressions while preserving its influ-
ence on minutiae insignificant.
In fingerprint verification systems, the uncontrolled sampling of fingerprint
results in unspecified orientations of collected images. As a result, the dis-
placements and rotations of fingerprints images collected from different pre-
sentation angles lead to different sets of features. Embedding watermark
into fingerprint image can cause additional effect to minutiae. A new water-
marking method based on DTCWT technique is developed for fingerprint
images. The capability of shift invariance and directional selectivity provided
by the Complex Wavelet Transform (CWT) is utilized to accommodate the
uncertainty of different fingerprint impressions while the double trees of the
DTCWT are used to keep the real and imaginary parts of the complex co-
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efficients separate, which make this transform approximately shift invariant
and having additional directionality.
2. Embedding a high payload of watermark into fingerprint images.
Embedding high payload of watermark into fingerprint image conflicts with
other watermarking requirements such as imperceptibility, robustness and
preserving minutiae from being affected by the embedding process. In this
regard, a new watermarking method is developed to embed multiple water-
marks of different sizes into fingerprint. The DWT of the host fingerprint
image contains two intermediate frequency domains. The DCT of two sep-
arate binary images watermarks are embedded into the middle frequency
bands (LH and HL). The DWT and DCT methods are thus combined in a
complementary fashion. The large sizes of the embedded watermarks allow
embedding more information about the fingerprint owner such as grayscale
face image and other text-related information which help to verify the gen-
uineness of the claimed identity.
3. Integrating multiple identifiers with camera-based fingerprint to
prevent fake fingerprint passes the authentication process in mo-
bile devices.
The fake fingerprint that can be obtained by attackers easily has been used
to cheat the fingerprint-based authentication system in mobile applications.
Watermark technology is employed to integrate the identities of two indi-
vidual entities, a mobile device and its owner, into a unique entity. The
DCT technique is employed to embed a watermark into selected blocks of
a fingerprint image captured with the mobile camera, and all processing is
performed within the mobile device.
The fingerprint watermarking algorithms have been developed aiming to verify
the origin of a fingerprint image. The watermarking methods for accommodating
fingerprint uncertainty and for high payloads embedment are robust in terms of
image compression, resizing, sharpening, rotation, cropping, Gaussian and salt-
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and-pepper noises, evidenced by wide range of experiments.
1.3 Thesis Organisation
The objectives of our research are addressed in seven chapters, with the current
chapter presenting an introduction to the thesis. The remaining chapters of the
thesis are structured as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the recent state-of-the-art methods for fingerprint-based au-
thentication system as well as fingerprint image pre-processing and fingerprint
minutiae extraction. Digital watermarking and its requirements are discussed.
Watermarking classification based on the embedding domains is explained. The
most up-to-date techniques for fingerprint watermarking are discussed. Finally, the
fingerprint database used in this thesis is presented.
In Chapter 3, a new watermarking technique is introduced using DTCWT tech-
nique for fingerprint images that are collected from different angles. A multiplicative-
based fusion is used to distribute the watermark evenly over the whole fingerprint
image. The user’s identity is linked with the fingerprint features to add extra au-
thentication factors to the authentication process. The effect of the watermark on
the fingerprint features is analysed and experimental results are presented.
Chapter 4 presents fingerprint watermarking schema with high payload while
preserving minutiae in the watermarked image. Multiple watermarks of various
sizes are embedded into fingerprint image. The implemented method utilizes DWT
and DCT techniques in a complementary manner to maximise the advantages of
both schemas. The influence of embedded watermarks on fingerprint minutiae is
investigated.
Chapter 5 elaborates on the robustness of the proposed techniques in the pres-
ence of noise and other image processing operations. The robustness of three pro-
posed watermarking algorithms is evaluated using six image operations.
In Chapter 6, multiple identifiers watermarking schema for touchless fingerprint
is proposed. The colour fingerprint image acquisition and enhancement stages are
10 (February 3, 2016)
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
presented and is followed by a description of the touchless fingerprint watermarking
schema. Colour fingerprint’s features extraction is explained in detail.
The summary of the thesis contributions, final conclusions and possible future
research directions are presented in Chapter 7.
11 (February 3, 2016)
Chapter2
Background
This chapter explains the fingerprint image and its features for identity authenti-
cation. The pre-processing steps to enhance fingerprint images and obtain a high-
quality image are described along with minutiae extraction algorithms. Digital
watermarks and their properties are explained in detail. State-of-the-art finger-
print watermarking methods are described next. Finally, the fingerprint database
used for experiments is provided.
For a long time, personal authentication has been an important issue in law
enforcement, business, and people’s daily lives. The main objective of personal
authentication is to determine or confirm identity claims by individuals. Besides
its applications in forensics, it has been widely used in various civilian applications
including attendance control and building access, automatic systems, computers
and mobile phones [11]. Personal authentication employs both verification and
identification, each with a specific application. In the verification mode, one-to-one
comparison is done to examine whether a person’s identity is as claimed; whereas in
the identification mode, one-to-many comparisons are conducted to recognise the
person’s identity.
Traditionally, personal authentication is based on what someone holds (e.g.
keys and ID cards) or what someone knows (e.g. passwords). These approaches
have several drawbacks. First, user knowledge and tokens can be lost, forgotten or
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stolen. Second, they can be rejected by service providers; that is, the perpetrator
can deny their wrongdoing and plead that the ID card or password was stolen.
Third, there is a risk of ’spoofing’ attack, so that the person that has the key or
password can access all services. Further, people are increasingly more mobile and
electronically connected, which has led to the discovery of new methods to identify
individuals remotely as traditional identification methods cannot be trusted [12].
Biometric personal authentication approaches have been introduced to solve
these problems [11; 13; 14; 15]. Biometrics describe the features of a person that
are permanent and (ideally) not changeable, forgotten or lost, rendering them a
more effective authentication technique than traditional methods [16]. Approaches
using biometrics overcome most of the shortcomings of traditional methods [17]
because they recognise an individual based on their anatomical (e.g. fingerprints,
face or iris) [18] or behavioural (e.g. speech) characteristics [14]. Also, the security
and convenience of biometric recognition methods has led to the implementation
of systems with much higher security than traditional methods. They have been
rapidly implemented in homes and businesses, and by governments around the
world [19; 20].
Among these different biometric modalities, fingerprints are the most widely
used and will continue to be the main revenue contributor [21]. A fingerprint is
represented by the impression of the pattern of ridges and valleys on the surface
of a fingertip. The uniqueness of a fingerprint is determined by the combination
of the pattern of ridges and valleys and the minutiae points [22]. Fingerprint
identification refers to the process of matching two samples of human fingertip
impressions to verify that both samples came from the same person [23]. It has
been known since the mid-1800s that fingerprints are unique to individuals and
to fingers of the same individual [12]. A number of more recent studies have
investigated the theoretical bounds on uniqueness or individuality of fingerprints
and identified the probability of two identical fingerprints [24; 25; 26]. Such research
has demonstrated that fingerprints are indeed unique, and highlights that it is not
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possible for two fingerprints (even two fingerprints of identical twins) to be exactly
alike. This justifies the use of fingerprints by authentication systems to identify
individuals and makes fingerprint-based technology the most suitable in practice
for authentication systems [14; 27].
Computer-based processing software for fingerprints was introduced in the early
1960s, providing the ability to process fingerprint images. This led to the devel-
opment and implementation of the automated fingerprint identification systems
(AFIS) that are widely used for fingerprint matching purposes. In the 1980s, the
technology revolution in personal computers and optical scanners allowed organisa-
tions to use fingerprints as identification features in non-criminal areas such as for
identity verification software. The explosion of biometric sensors and matching algo-
rithms led to the implementation of biometric applications by health care providers,
financial institutions, government sectors and other institutions. Examples of these
applications include access control, network and web security, and data protection.
In the late 1990s, rapid development of reliable fingerprint capture devices allowed
employment of fingerprints for personal use. Today, fingerprints are used to verify
the identity of individuals in mobile device applications such as iPhones.
This thesis focuses on fingerprint biometrics and investigates the most widely
used features of fingerprints for the purpose of user authentication. A brief review
of fingerprint biometrics is provided in the following section.
2.1 Fingerprint-based Authentication Systems
Authentication is the process that identifies individuals based on their identity. It
enables a valid user to access system resources. Traditional authentication schemes
are knowledge based; for example, requiring a password. Liao [28] identified 10
requirements for robust remote authentication based on passwords. For example,
the password must not be saved on the client’s device, cannot be discovered by the
server and must be encrypted once transmitted on a network. Lamport [29] in 1981
proposed the one-time password approach for remote authentication using a pass-
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word table, but this has several weaknesses. For example, it can be attacked if the
passwords in the password table are modified or stolen. Much research has focused
on improving the efficiency and security of authentication schemes. Passwords can
facilitate non-repudiation as they can be forgotten, lost, shared, or even broken by
simple dictionary attacks. Thus, it is impossible to confirm the authenticity of the
claimed user. Chein et al. [30] introduced a new mutual authentication approach
that communicates between the user and server using a smart card based on a
one-way hash function. This approach has low computation costs and uses freely
chosen passwords without verification tables. However, it is susceptible to session
and guessing attacks, and the secret information saved on the smart card can be
hacked [31; 32; 33; 34]. To overcome the weaknesses of knowledge-based methods,
biometric patterns that are part of the person, such as fingerprints, faces and irises,
are proposed as a practical solution for remote authentication systems.
In [35; 36], more authentication factors are proposed to enhance the security
of a system by combining personal characteristics such as fingerprints along with
the password and smart card. Lee et al. [37] introduced a fingerprint-based remote
authentication approach using smart cards. They implemented an advanced version
of Hwang and Li’s method [38] by applying fingerprint verification based on a
smart card and secret keys from two servers. Their method is based on ElGamal
encryption, which verifies user-enrolled fingerprints based on the matching of the
extracted minutiae points [39; 40]. However, the system uses only a one-way
authentication method and is subject to server spoofing attacks.
The revolution in mobile communication technology has rendered remote user
authentication essential for accessing remote resources. The advantages of biomet-
rics, such as its convenience, reliability and user-friendly, mean that it can used
in remote authentication applications via PCs, mobile phones and access control
devices. Mobile devices such as notebooks and mobile phones have been used
widely for this purpose. Recently, fingerprint capturing sensors have been incorpo-
rated into mobile devices, which will lead to a revolution in remote authentication
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[30; 41; 42]. The reliable fingerprint-based authentication system consists of com-
plex image pre-processing steps to enhance fingerprint image quality [43]. The
pre-processing steps are explained in detail in the following section.
2.1.1 Fingerprint Image Pre-processing
Captured fingerprint images usually suffer from irrelevant background that affects
image quality and feature clarity. Therefore, several pre-processing steps are re-
quired to improve the appearance of fingerprint features and to simplify the task
of minutiae extraction [27; 44]. To achieve this, segmentation, enhancement and
binarisation steps are applied.
Segmentation separates the region of interest from background noise. In seg-
mentation, the foreground region is separated from the background image for more
reliable minutiae extraction. It allows for the avoidance of the extraction of features
in noisy areas of the fingerprint and background. Different average magnitudes of
gradient are used in each image block to effectively distinguish between the finger-
print area and the background [45].
Ideal fingerprint images contain ridges and valleys that flow alternately in a
constant direction, allowing easy identification of the minutiae points. However,
in practice, a significant percentage of fingerprint images are poor quality due to
skin conditions, sensor noise, incorrect finger pressure and inherently low-quality
fingerprints (e.g. in elderly people or manual workers) that create corrupt and
very noisy ridge patterns. These factors affect the quality of input fingerprint
images and create further problems in minutiae extraction, such as the production
of spurious minutiae, missing genuine minutiae and false orientation of minutiae.
Thus, enhancement algorithms are necessary to improve the clarity of poor-quality
fingerprint images. The image enhancement method proposed by Hong et al. [27]
accepts the host fingerprint and employs a number of pre-processing steps. These
include normalisation to mean and variance, estimation of the local orientation of an
image based on least mean square orientation, and estimation of the local frequency
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of an image. In addition, masking of regions is applied after categorisation of blocks
of the normalised host image as recoverable or unrecoverable. A bank of Gabor
filters [46] are applied to obtain an enhanced fingerprint image by applying the
ridge frequency to the ridge-and-valley pixels in the normalised host image [27].
An example of an enhanced binary image is provided in Figure 2.1.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.1: A fingerprint from the United States National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) database, (b) the Gabor filter response and (c) the binary image that
will be thinned and used for minutiae extraction.
The conversion of a fingerprint grayscale image to a binary image is fundamental
to minutiae extraction methods. Some enhancement algorithms directly produce
a binary output and these images undergo a thinning stage where the thickness
of the ridge lines is reduced to one pixel. This creates a simple image scan, and
the pixel-wise computation of crossing numbers allows easy identification of the
minutiae. The fingerprint grey image is converted to binary using the threshold
operation as follows:
I(x, y) =
I(x, y) = 255, if I(x, y) > θI(x, y) = 0, otherwise (2.1)
where IB refers to the generated binary fingerprint image. I(x, y) represents the
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pixel intensity value of the grayscale fingerprint image and θ is the threshold, which
is empirically determined as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.2: A fingerprint image, (a) at grayscale, (b) after enhancement and binarisa-
tion, and (c) after thinning.
To ensure acceptable results through binarisation, an approach based on peak
detection in the grey-level profiles along sections orthogonal to the ridge orientation
was introduced. A 16×16 window is oriented on each pixel and the intensities with
respect to the central section identify the grey-level profile of the image. It is then
smoothed through local averaging, showing the peaks and the two neighbouring
pixels on either side, which constitute the foreground. After the thinning stage,
minutiae detection from the binary images is performed.
2.1.2 Fingerprint Minutiae Extraction
Minutiae extraction is a vital step in the matching process between two fingerprint
samples [47; 48]. A fingerprint minutiae detection algorithm is applied to extract
the correct minutiae points. Various such algorithms have been described in the
literature [49]. They are categorised as grayscale-based or binary-based methods.
In grayscale methods, the minutiae points are detected from the original fingerprint
image; for example, using a fuzzy-based method [50]. Four main schemes are mostly
used in fingerprint matching systems: grayscale [51], skeleton image [52], phase
image [53] and minutiae [54]. Of these, the minutiae-based method is used most
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commonly [48]. Minutiae points are extracted from the thinned skeleton by locating
the ridge-endings and bifurcations according to the number of neighbouring pixels.
Ridge-endings are identified as minutiae points if they have a single neighbour and
ridge bifurcations, if there are more than two neighbours.
The binary fingerprint image is thinned using a morphological thinning oper-
ation that makes the pixels of the ridges only one pixel wide [55]. To find the
minutiae points, the thinned fingerprint image is scanned with a nine-pixel (3× 3),
mask (Figure 2.3). If the central pixel is white and has only one neighbour that is
white, then the central pixel is identified as a termination point. If the central pixel
is white and has three white neighbours, then the central pixel is identified as a
bifurcation point. This may result in false minutiae points, which can be identified
by the following process: if a central pixel is a bifurcation point and has two or more
neighbours that are bifurcation points and are on different sides of the central pixel,
then only the central pixel will be listed as a bifurcation point and the others are
marked as false points. The presentation angle which refers to the direction of the
finger on the sensor can be different at various fingerprint capturing. The difference
in the presentation angle can lead to different set of minutiae, thus, the extracted
minutiae from one fingerprint may not match the extracted minutiae from another
fingerprint of the same finger. Both Verifinger SDK and MATLAB are used for the
fingerprint preprocessing steps and minutiae extraction. Our own MATLAB code
is used for the pre-processing steps to enhance the quality of the fingerprint image.
Verifinger is used to enhance the friction ridge structure. The minutiae points are
extracted using a code developed in MATLAB.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Sample masks used for (a) termination and (b) bifurcation point detection.
Figure 2.4 illustrates minutiae points extracted from a sample fingerprint image.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: (a) An original fingerprint image and (b) a skeleton image showing minutiae
points on the original fingerprint image.
2.2 Digital Watermarking
A digital watermark refers to a secret code-dependent signal typically inserted in
noise-tolerant digital data (audio, video or image) and that can later be decoded
or extracted. Through digital watermarking, information such as legal destination,
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origin and rights to access also can be embedded in multimedia content without
introducing any discernible distortions. Although fingerprint-based authentication
systems have better performance compared to traditional authentication systems,
there are several related problems. For instance, a fake fingerprint can be easily
constructed by attackers. Also, a fingerprint sample cannot be canceled or replaced
if they are compromised. Therefore, a watermarking technique can be used to
validate the authenticity of fingerprint samples.
2.2.1 Watermarking Embedding Domains
Various watermarking approaches have been designed to embed watermarks in dig-
ital images. Based on the domain in which the watermark pattern is embedded,
watermarking techniques can be classified as spatial [56; 57] or transform domain
[58; 59] algorithms. Each type has benefits and drawbacks.
• Spatial-based watermarking
In spatial domains, watermarks can easily be added to a host image by chang-
ing grayscale pixels [60]. One of the most common approaches in spatial-
based watermarking is to change the least significant bits (LSBs) of the image
pixel [61]. Enhancements and improvements to these techniques were pre-
sented in [62; 63]. Similar methods have since been established to be robust
against filtering, scanning and compression. This technique has several ad-
vantages, such as its low level of complexity and its ease of implementation.
However, LSB methods are not recommended for watermarking algorithms
because they have been found prone to image operations by statistical or
even visual methods [64; 65].
• Transform-based watermarking
The transform domain methods are widely used for robust watermarking
algorithms, where the watermark is embedded by modifying some of the
selected coefficients [66; 67; 68; 58; 69]. Determining the frequency band
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at which to embed the watermark pattern in the transform domain algo-
rithms is an important issue. There are various types of transform domain
that are widely used for digital image watermarking: discrete cosine trans-
form (DCT) [58; 69; 70], discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [71] and discrete
fourier transform (DFT) [72]. In general, the most significant bit (MSB) is
not suitable to embed a robust watermark because it may cause the water-
mark to become visible [73]. Thus, specifying where to embed the watermark
is a trade-off between perception and robustness. In contrast to spatial-based
techniques, transform domain methods allow the embedding of large water-
marks into digital image without causing noticeable affect.
In [74], Xiang et al. proposed a modified patchwork algorithm in the discrete
cosine transform (DCT) domain to increase the embedding capacity and to resist
de-synchronization attacks. Watermark payload of sizes 10 bps and 16 bps are em-
bedded into audio signal using the discrete cosine transform (DCT) domain. Then,
synchronization bits are implanted into the logarithmic DCT (LDCT) domain of
the watermarked signal. At the extraction phase, the scaling factor is detrained by
investigating the LDCT of the received signal to remove the scaling effect and the
synchronization bits. Then, the embedded watermark is extracted. Their method
has better performance in terms of embedding high capacity of watermark and
resists to de-synchronization attacks.
2.2.2 Fingerprint Watermarking Techniques
A number of techniques have been proposed for fingerprint image watermarking. A
watermarking in wavelet domain method is presented in [75], in which a watermark
is added to a wavelet scalar quantisation (WSQ) compressed fingerprint image. A
fragile watermarking technique for fingerprint image verification was proposed in
[1], where the fingerprint image is watermarked by using a verification key. This
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technique can find any region of the image that has been tampered with: the original
watermark pattern is first transformed into another mixed pattern that creates
a new watermark pattern to improve the security of the watermark data. The
mixed pattern does not have a meaningful appearance, in contrast to the original
watermark pattern, which may contain a specific logo or text. This watermarking
technique creates significant performance loss in fingerprint verification.
In DCT domain, an image is split into different frequency bands, making it
much easier to embed watermarking information in its middle frequency bands. The
middle frequency bands are selected because the most visually significant sections
of the image (corresponding to low frequencies bands) are to be avoided so that they
do not become over-exposed and have their risk of removal increased through noise
attacks (corresponding to high-frequency bands). Srayazdi et al. [75] proposed a
grey-level watermarking method that works through division of the cover image into
4× 4 non-overlapping blocks that align with the 8× 8 blocks used for a DCT. This
allows the use of these blocks to derive four estimates of the first five 8×8 block DCT
coefficients. Thereafter, a grey-level value is embedded through replacement of the
low-frequency DCT value in a block with the respective estimated modified values.
One drawback of this scheme is that attackers can do this too, suggesting that it
is only the secrecy of the algorithm that hides it. Sverdlov et al. [1] developed a
novel hybrid robust non-blind watermarking scheme that is DCT and singular value
decomposition (SVD) based. In this method, after the application of DCT to the
host image, DCT coefficients are remapped, forming four quadrants representing
frequency bands from the highest to the lowest. Thereafter, the SVD is applied
in each quadrant. The technique subsequently modifies single values found in each
quadrant to achieve a set of adjusted DCT coefficients. The process of decoding
involves mapping the altered DCT coefficients back to their original positions while
applying an inverse equation to generate a watermarked cover image.
In DWT domain, the image is represented by two-dimensional DWT and is
decomposed into four bands of data called (LL), (HL), (LH) and (HH) bands. The
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LL denotes the low-pass band, the horizontal (HL) and the vertical (LH) denote the
mid-frequency bands and the high-pass band is represented by the diagonal (HH)
[76]. The different classification of the DWT bands allows embedding multiple
watermarks into the image. In general, the embedded watermark into the low-
pass (LL) band more robust to attacks but affect the quality of the watermarked
image. On the other hand, the embedded watermark into the high-pass (HH) band
is not visible but the robustness is affected. Therefore, it is usually recommended
to embed the watermark in the mid-frequency bands HL and LH [77].
In [78], Ratha et al. proposed a data concealing method, which can be applied
to WSQ wavelet compressed fingerprint images. The DWT coefficients are altered
during WSQ encoding, taking into account possible image deterioration. Pankanti
and Yeung [79] proposed a fragile watermarking method for use in fingerprint ver-
ification. They embed a spatial watermark image in the fingerprint image’s spatial
domain through a verification key. The proposed method can identify any region of
an image that has been tampered with. Pankanti and Yeung suggested that their
technique does not significantly decrease the performance of fingerprint verification.
Jain [80] used a semi-unique key based on local block averages to detect tampering
with host images, including of faces and fingerprints. In addition, Gunsel et al. [81]
described two spatial domain watermarking techniques for fingerprint images. One
method applies gradient orientation analysis while embedding the watermark, and
does not modify any of the features extracted using gradient information. The sec-
ond method maintains the singular points within the fingerprint image, such that
the watermarked image’s classification is not affected (e.g. into arch, left loop).
To detect tampering with fingerprint images, a semi-unique key based on local
block averages was presented in [78]. A watermarking method that preserves the
quantised gradient orientations at and around watermark embedding was presented
in [82]. All of the fingerprint features and singular points extracted using gradient
information are preserved in the fingerprint image. Gunsel et al. [79] proposed a
spatial technique to insert a watermark in a fingerprint image without destroying
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the fingerprint characteristics. The proposed technique first detects the fingerprint
characteristics, and then embeds the watermark into the fingerprint image in order
to avoid the distortion that a watermark may cause to the fingerprint features.
However, it is not clear whether this method will result in fingerprint features
being affected by adding the watermark data or if it will retain their characteristics.
Hiding a facial image in a fingerprint image was proposed in [83]. In this method,
the eigenface coefficients of a user’s face were embedded in the fingerprint image,
and the facial image recovered during decoding can be used to establish authenticity.
A combination of DWT and LSB for fingerprint watermarking was proposed in [84].
This algorithm embeds a facial image using a combination of DWT and LSB to
protect the fingerprint from both frequency and geometric attacks.
The complex wavelet transform (CWT) is an extension to the standard DWT.
The CWT uses a one tree (in one-dimensional (1-D) signals) of filters with complex
coefficients. However, it has not been employed in the past due to difficulties in de-
signing complex wavelets. The Dual-tree Complex Wavelet Transform (DTCWT) is
an improved technique of CWT, which uses two trees to separate the real and imag-
inary parts of the complex coefficients. The DTCWT is more efficient compared to
CWT and DWT because it has the advantage of being more approximately shift
invariant and having additional directionality. The extra coefficients at each level
are generated by the redundant DWT. In the proposed DTCWT-based watermark-
ing method, if one coefficient of the fingerprint image is subjected to a significant
effect, the watermark pattern is embedded into the extra coefficient while the orig-
inal coefficients remain the same. In this case, the watermark does not affect the
fingerprint’s minutiae.
2.2.3 Evaluation Criteria of Fingerprint Watermarking Techniques
Each watermarking method is evaluated based on a set of criteria depending on the
target of the proposed application. These include imperceptibility and robustness
against damage and may contain many bits of information [85; 86]. Fingerprint
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watermarking techniques are evaluated using the same criteria as well as the ef-
fect degree of the embedded watermark on minutiae. The evaluation criteria are
discussed in detail as follows:
• Imperceptibility
Imperceptibility refers to watermark’s permanent transparency which should
not be discernible to the human visual system (HVS). In other words, it
should be no visible difference between the watermarked and original signals
[87; 88]. In some watermarking applications, the watermark must be easily
recognized by the appropriate authority, even though it remains unnoticed
to the normal eye.
• Robustness
Robust watermark refers to the ability of the watermark to survive the mod-
ification of the genuine image or signals. It has to be very difficult for attack-
ers to forge data in order to remove it. A watermark needs only to survive
attacks and signal processing operations that could occur when the water-
mark is within a communication channel such as image translation, scaling,
cropping or rotation. It is not required for every watermark application to
be robust to all attacks. The robustness of the watermark could affect it’s
perceptual quality [89].
• Capacity
Fundamentally, capacity of watermark refers to the amount of data that can
be embedded inside the host signal. The watermark capacity can be also
conflict with imperceptibility and robustness. High capacity always comes at
a cost of robustness, imperceptibility or both.
• A watermark’s influence on minutiae
The embedding of a watermark into a fingerprint image will affect its minu-
tiae distribution and classification. As a result, the matching between the
original and the watermarked images for authentication purposes will be af-
fected. Therefore, the influence level of the embedded watermark on finger-
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print minutiae is investigated as one of the evaluation criteria.
2.3 Fingerprint Databases
To perform and evaluate watermarking experiments, a fingerprint database is re-
quired that has enough samples with different captions. The CASIA fingerprint im-
age database version 5.0 (CASIA-FingerprintV5) contains 20, 000 fingerprint images
from 500 subjects. The fingerprint images in CASIA- FingerprintV5 were captured
using a URU4000 fingerprint sensor in a single session. Volunteer subjects included
graduate students, workers and waiters, etc. Each volunteer contributed 40 finger-
print images: five from each of eight digits (left and right thumb/second/third/fourth
finger). The volunteers were asked to rotate their fingers with varying levels of pres-
sure to generate significant intra-class variation. All fingerprint images are 8 bit,
grey-level bitmap (BMP) files with a resolution of 328× 356 [90]. A set of 500 fin-
gerprint images for 100 finger are used to evaluate the proposed method in Chapter
3.
Other fingerprint databases are provided by the United States National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) (e.g. NIST Special Database 4, 9 and 27) and
are publicly available for download and analysis. These databases typically consist
of images acquired from F different fingers that were obtained by placing the finger
onto the sensing plate of an image acquisition device. Each finger is sensed multiple
times, and potentially a different number of times for the different fingers. The
databases have a common number of multiple acquisitions, (say, L) for each finger,
resulting in a total of F × L images in the database. Due to the different sensors
used, as well as varying placement of the finger onto the sensing plate, the images
acquired exhibit significant variability (even for the same finger). This database
are used for the proposed schema in Chapter 4 and 5.
We have developed a touchless fingerprint database that is used for the im-
plementation of the algorithm proposed in Chapter 6. The fingerprint images are
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captured using iPhone 6 camera. These databases consist of 200 touchless finger-
print images collected from different fingers of five persons, captured on a mobile
camera. Five images of four fingers of each person are captured.
Different evaluated metrics are used to evaluate the watermarking algorithms
proposed in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 because the available resources are not sufficient to
implement the algorithms. For example, there is no public database for touchless
fingerprints available to evaluate the algorithm proposed in Chapter 6. Instead, we
have generated our own database. Also, the current available mobile resources are
not sufficient to implement the watermarking algorithm.
2.4 Conclusion
Fingerprint-based authentication systems offer some significant advantages over tra-
ditional systems. Fingerprint features are real human physiological characteristics,
unique, permanent and not changeable. However, biometric characteristics are not
secret and fake fingerprint image can be recontracted easily. Therefore, fingerprint
sample can not be trusted for unattend-based authentication applications. Water-
marking technique can be used to embed text-related information of the claimed
person into the fingerprint image in order to prove the authenticity of the finger-
print sample. Several fingerprint watermarking schemas have been proposed in the
literature for different purpose, however, a good fingerprint watermarking schema
has to meet the requirements of the digital watermark.
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A Directional-based Watermarking
Schema for Fingerprint Images
Collected From Different Angles
3.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, fingerprint-based authentication techniques have inher-
ent advantages over traditional (knowledge-based or token-based) techniques for
authentication systems. However, it is important to know that, fingerprint recog-
nition systems are not usually spoof-proof [91]. The main potential threat for
fingerprint-based authentication systems is presenting fake fingerprint for unat-
tended applications. To address this problem, watermarking technique can be used
to prove the authenticity of fingerprint image [92].
Watermarking technique can be used for fingerprint image to provide additional
authentication factor for identification purposes [9]. In this scenario, the watermark
message is constructed based on identification information about the owner of the
fingerprint image. Both watermark message and fingerprint image are integrated
together using watermarking schema. To prove the authenticity of the acquired
fingerprint sample, the extracted watermark message and the extracted features
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of the watermarked fingerprint image are compared with their counterparts in the
database. Afterwards, genuine decision is generated in case of matched result is
obtained.
The uncertainty issue of fingerprint images is associated with the level of sim-
ilarity between two fingerprint impressions of the same finger [93]. Fingerprint
matching process is mainly based on matched minutiae points [10]. It is confirmed
that 12 minutiae points are enough to obtain genuine matching between two dif-
ferent fingerprint images of same finger [12; 25]. However, it is challenging task
to obtain matched result between watermarked fingerprint and its correspondence
unwatermarked in the database if both are collected from different presentation
angles. The reasons are because (i) the extracted matched minutiae obtained from
two fingerprint images that are collected from different angles are few [94], (ii) the
embedding process of watermark into different samples of fingerprint can distort
minutiae points [95], for example, correct minutiae can be missed and spurious
minutiae may be created which in turn affects the uncertainty associated with re-
jecting or accepting the claimed person. Therefore, It is challenging to embed wa-
termark into fingerprint images collected from different presentation angles without
affect their minutiae.
In [1], Yeung et al. proposed a watermarking schema for different fingerprint
images obtained from the same finger. The proposed watermarking method inves-
tigates the effects of fragile watermarking on fingerprint minutiae for fingerprint
recognition system. The main objective of their method focused on whether fin-
gerprint recognition system able to determine if two fingerprint images of same
finger, input (watermarked) and template, are matched after watermarking. Their
results showed that the embedded watermark has insignificant influence on fin-
gerprint minutiae. However, if a large number of pixels are manipulated by the
watermarking method, the minutiae extraction process will be affected. In other
word, minutiae points may not be detected or may be disoriented significantly.
Thus, the matching between two fingerprint images from same finger will be seri-
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ously affected. Also, their watermarking schema can be used only for checking the
integrity of fingerprint images before applying the verification process of a claimed
identity, but cannot be used for the secure transmission of fingerprint sample over
insecure network. Jinhua et al. in [96] proposed an image watermarking method
based on the perceptual model of the HVS using the advantages of the DTCWT.
The host image was decomposed into six sub-bands, then the watermark was em-
bedded into each sub-band using JND (Just Noticeable Difference) to control the
watermark capacity. Based on the experimental results, their method was robust
against geometric distortions, Gaussian noise, JPEG compression and Gaussian low
pass filtering attacks. In [97], Ramani et al. proposed a copyright protection algor-
ithm for digital images using a combination of DTCWT and DCT techniques. The
proposed method was robust against compression, scaling, and noise attacks; how-
ever, it lacked robustness against cropping attack and the capacity of the embedded
watermark. Gaurav et al. in [98] proposed a new watermarking technique based
on the fractional dual tree complex wavelet transform (FrDT-CWT) and singular
value decomposition (SVD). The watermark was embedded in the host image based
on a key that was generated using biometrics information. The host image was ran-
domized using Hessen berg decomposition and a chaotic map, then the watermark
was embedded into FrDT-CWT domain by modifying the singular values of the
randomized image. Jayavani et al. in [99], proposed a multi-resolution watermark-
ing algorithm using the DTCWT technique. The watermark coefficients of the low
and high frequency bands were embedded into the most significant coefficients of
the low and high frequency bands of the host image. The experimental results of
their method demonstrate that the method is robust against image compression
and resizing.
The aforementioned DTCWT algorithms in [96; 97; 98; 99] have proposed rea-
sonable robust watermarking methods against image processing operations. How-
ever, the issue of uncertainty in relation to fingerprint images has not been dis-
cussed in the past. The uncertainty issue is associated with the level of similarity
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between two fingerprint impressions of the same finger. The uncontrolled sampling
of fingerprints results in unspecified orientations of collected images due to the dis-
placements and rotations of fingerprint images collected from different presentation
angles. The embedded watermark can also have an additional effect on minutiae.
In this chapter, a novel fingerprint watermarking technique that addresses the issue
of uncertainty of fingerprint images is proposed. The main aim of the developed
watermarking algorithm is to extend the DTCWT technique to embed a watermark
into fingerprint images without corrupt minutiae significantly. The influence and
the level of corruption made by the embedded watermark on minutiae have been in-
vestigated in section 3.4.1. Figure 3.4 shows the effect of the embedded watermark
on different fingerprint images collected from different presentation angles. Also,
the correctly extracted minutiae and missed minutiae from watermarked images are
illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Mabtoul et al. [100] proposed a new watermarking schema based on Dual-tree
Complex Wavelet Transform (DTCWT) technique for gray-scale image. In this
method, the DTCWT is utilized to split the input gray-scale image into real and
imaginary parts. Different parts of the encrypted watermark are embedded into
different blocks of the real part of the 3-level DTCWT. the watermark is embedded
only into the real part. The proposed algorithm in Chapter 3 has extended the
work in [100] where the watermark was embedded into the real part of the image.
The watermarking algorithm in [100] is applied for digital images while the wa-
termarking algorithm proposed in this chapter is developed for fingerprint images
which have unique minutiae that shouldnt be affected by the embedded watermark.
The real part represents the less important information of the image. In contrast,
the imaginary part has a larger amount of information which represents fingerprint
minutiae [101]. In case of only the real part is used for fingerprint watermark em-
bedding and an unauthorised person tries to extract the watermark, minutia point
will not be affected because the real part contains less information. In other words,
the attack will not be detected if the watermark is embedded into the real part
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only. To address this problem, the watermarking algorithm proposed in this chap-
ter embeds the watermark into both the real and imaginary parts. As explained in
section 3.2, this is preferable because the watermark is embedded into all the image
parts and if an attack occurs while transmitting, it can be easily identified as the
minutia distribution will be affected.
The DTCWT technique proposes additional properties over other wavelet trans-
forms such as Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [102]. For example, DTCWT
offers better directional selectivity in 2-dimensions and shows better performance
of image displacements and rotations. However, DTCWT was not be used for fin-
gerprint watermarking schema in the past. In this chapter, a new DTCWT-based
watermarking schema for fingerprint images that are collected from different presen-
tation angles is proposed. Unlike the algorithm introduced in [1], where fingerprint
minutiae will be affected significantly if large number of fingerprint pixels are up-
dated, the proposed watermarking schema in this chapter embed the watermark
into the whole image while preserving the influence of the embedded watermark
on minutiae at low level. Compared to the proposed algorithm in [100], which
embeds the watermark into the real part of the image, the proposed watermarking
algorithm in this chapter embeds the watermark into both the real and imaginary
parts. This is preferable because if an attack occurs while transmitting, it can
be easily identified. In other words, if only the real part is used for watermark
embedding and an unauthorised person tries to extract the watermark, minutia
point information will not be changed because the real part contains less infor-
mation. The imaginary part has a larger amount of information which represents
fingerprint minutiae while the real part represents the less important information
of the image [101]. As explained in section 3.2, the watermark is embedded into
both real and imaginary parts. An attack attempt can be easily identified if the
minutiae distribution has been changed. In any attempt to attack the image, the
imaginary part will be affected where the minutia points are located. In this case,
the minutia distribution will be changed. In contrast to using only the real part
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for the embedding process, the minutiae will not be affected by the attack because
the minutiae points are not distributed in the real part.
To evaluate the proposed watermarking algorithm, five different fingerprint im-
ages of the same finger for each person are investigated. One image is set as a
template without a watermark. The other four images are called ’sample images’
and contain the watermark information. The matching score between the template
and each sample image is calculated using their minutiae points. To investigate the
watermark influence on the fingerprint images, a comparison is made between the
template and the other fingerprint images before watermarking. Then, the water-
mark is embedded into fingerprint sample images are compared with the template
image. The results of these two tests are then compared to inspect the influence
of the watermark on the fingerprint minutiae. The experimental results show that
the watermarked images obtained by the proposed DTCWT-based watermarking
algorithm able to satisfy the requirements of fingerprint-based recognition systems
where 12 minutiae points are enough to consider two fingerprint images are ob-
tained from same finger [25]. This chapter presents a detailed description of the
DTCWT-based watermarking algorithm followed by experimental results, and final
conclusions.
3.2 Directional-based Wavelet Transform
Due to several advantages of the transform domain, many digital watermarking
schemas are developed in this way. In general, DWT has been used to produce wa-
termark images with the best visual quality. However, it has two drawbacks [103].
First it lacks shift invariance, which means small shifts in input signal can cause
significant changes in the energy distribution of the wavelet coefficients. Second,
DWT has poor directional selectivity for diagonal features, which is evident from
the impulse responses of the filters of individual sub-bands. Also, the displacements
and rotations of fingerprints images collected from different presentation angles lead
to different sets of features.
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To overcome the above issues, a Complex Wavelet Transform (CWT) is more
computationally efficient and has only a modest amount of redundancy, yet provides
approximate shift invariance and good directional selectivity. CWT is represented
in the form of complex values scaling functions [104] and complex valued wavelet
functions as:
ψo (s) = ψa (s) + jψb (s) (3.1)
where ψa (s) are real, j ψb (s) are imaginary and ψo (s) is the analytic signal
[105; 106]. The complex scaling function is defined in similar ways. However,
complex wavelets have not been widely employed in the past due to difficulties
in designing complex wavelets. An improved implementation of the CWT, the
DTCWT [102], has been developed that is efficient for image watermarking. In
contrast with conventional implementations of the CWT which uses a single tree
(in one-dimensional (1-D) signals) of filters with complex coefficients, the DTCWT
uses two trees, to keep the real and imaginary parts of the complex coefficients sep-
arate. Therefore, the redundancy at the output is still 2 : 1. For two-dimensional
(2-D) signals, the two trees first operate on the rows and then the columns of the
data. The redundancy thus rises to 4 : 1. This transform has the advantage of be-
ing approximately shift invariant and having additional directionality (+15, +45,
+75, -15, -45 and -75) compared with the three directions (horizontal, vertical and
diagonal) in traditional DWT. The DWT has features of selectivity with three di-
rections only, whereas the DTCWT offers 12 direction wavelets that include six for
the real tree and six for the imaginary tree at the angles ±50,±100,±150 in two
dimensions [104].
In the proposed method here, the fingerprint images of same finger are collected
from different presentation angles. Therefore, the coordinates and the angle of
image (B) can be determine based on the coordinates and the angle of image (A)
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where both are collected from same finger according to:
x2 = cos(θ)× (x1 − x0)− sin(θ)× (y1 − y0) + x0
y2 = sin(θ)× (x1 − x0)− cos(θ)× (y1 − y0) + y0
(3.2)
where (x0, y0) are the coordinates of the center of image A and θ is the new angle
of image B, (x1, y1) are the coordinates of image A where (x2, y2) are the new
coordinates of image B.
The DTCWT employs real and imaginary parts on fingerprint images that
jointly give an overall transform as ψi (s) and ψj (s). After the two parts are gen-
erated, the complex wavelet is approximated as:
ψ (s) = ψi (s) + jψj (s) (3.3)
In the 2-D DTCWT, a 2-D wavelet function ψ (a , b) = ψ (a)ψ (b) is integrated
with the row− column of the wavelet transform, where ψ (a) is a complex wavelet
represented by ψ (a) = ψi (a) + jψj (a). ψ (a , b) is obtained from the equation:
ψ (a , b) = [ψi (a) + jψj (a)] [ψi (b) + jψj (b)]
= ψi (a)ψi (b)− ψj (a)ψj (b)
+ j [ψj (a) ψi (b) + ψi (a)ψj (b)]
(3.4)
The real and imaginary parts of the complex wavelet is taken, and then the
sums of the two separable wavelets are obtained:
<{ψi (a , b)} = ψi (a)ψi (b)− ψj (a)ψj (b) (3.5)
The watermark has a checkerboard-type pattern. A directional filter of DTCWT
is applied on the watermarked image for decomposition purposes. The resultant
images are the output of the one-directional filter from the low- and high-pass filters.
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The real and imaginary parts of the DTCWT decomposition of the fingerprint and
watermark image are shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.1: (a) A fingerprint image and its (b) imaginary and (c) real coefficients.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.2: (a) A watermark pattern and its (b) imaginary and (c) real part.
Most of the coefficients are centred on zero and range between −100 and +100.
In fingerprint image decomposition, high-value coefficients represent ridges, short
ridges and other transition points, usually known as minutiae points. At watermark
decomposition using DTCWT, coefficients are in the range of −80 to +80. The
wavelet coefficient distribution is highly skewed to values below 10 with very few
values larger than this. These high-value coefficients coincide with the boundary
between black and white (or white and black). In fingerprint decomposition, the
wavelet coefficients range increases drastically from −300 to +350 at Level 2 and
from −600 to +600 at Level 3. At the 4th level, DTCWT coefficients are in the
range of −700 to 700. In the watermarked image, the DTCWT coefficients vary at
Level 2 from around −150 to +130 and at Level 3, from −300 to +300.
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3.3 Multiplicative-based Fingerprint Watermarking Schema
The DTCWT domain is used to embed the watermark data into fingerprint images.
DTCWT removes the directionality and shift variance problems present in the
wavelet transforms by using complex basis functions. For decomposition purposes,
DTCWT uses directional filters. These directional filters are able to extract the
same information, such as minutiae, even after the watermark has been embedded
into the image. The multiplicative fusion rule is used to combine the fingerprint
image coefficients and the watermarked image coefficients after decomposition. In
this way, the watermark is embedded into the fingerprint images. Figure 3.3 shows
a block diagram for the watermarking algorithm.
Figure 3.3: Watermarking algorithm diagram
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3.3.1 Watermark Embedding
DTCWT is first performed on both the fingerprint and watermarked images up
to four levels. At each level, DTCWT coefficients are sorted according to their
magnitude in ascending order. F (x, y) is the image and X, Y and Z are the real,
imaginary and complex coefficients at each level of decomposition, respectively. In
this case, m=1...4 is the level of decomposition, and n = 1...N is the number of
coefficients present at each level of decomposition.
The DTCWT coefficients of the fingerprint image are denoted as:
Zmn = Xmn + jYmn (3.6)
The DTCWT coefficients of the watermark image are denoted as:
Wmn = Umn + jVmn (3.7)
where U , V and W are the real, imaginary and complex coefficients at each level of
decomposition. For embedding purposes, the multiplicative rule is used at each scale
and orientation to combine the real and the imaginary parts using their coefficients.
In this case, the watermark is evenly distributed over the whole fingerprint image.
As the watermark image coefficients contain many zeroes, after they are used as
multipliers the fingerprint coefficients will be effectively zero. To avoid this issue,
the original value (after decomposition) is added to values after the multiplication,
as shown in Equation 3.8. At each level of decomposition, the multiplicative rule
is applied as follows:
Znew = Zmn +Xmn × Umn + j (Ymn × Vmn) (3.8)
where Znew is the modified DTCWT coefficient. In the method presented here, the
real part coefficients of the fingerprint and watermark images, and the imaginary
part coefficients of fingerprint and watermark images are multiplied separately.
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These values are added to the fingerprint image that includes original real and
imaginary Zmn = Xmn + jYmn coefficients. After all the DTCWT coefficients have
been modified, the inverse wavelet transform is then applied to retrieve the image
domain and achieve the final watermarked image.
The multiplicative fusion rule does not greatly affect fingerprint image coeffi-
cients for the following reasons:
1. The number of high-value coefficients in the watermarked image is much
lower because a normalising process is performed for the coefficients after
the decomposing process. In this step, we divide the DTCWT coefficients
in each level by the average value of the coefficients.
2. In the proposed method, the fingerprint image is subjected to preprocessing
steps as explained in the background chapter in section 2.1.1. Three stages,
segmentation, enhancement and binarisation, are applied to the fingerprint
image to increase its quality and remove the noise. Figure 2.4 (a) shows
the quality of original fingerprint image before preprocessing steps. The en-
hanced image which is used in the proposed method is shown in Figure 2.4
(b). In this stage, the resultant image is transformed using DTCWT and
represented by different ranges of high-value and low-value coefficients. The
coefficients with larger magnitude values have a larger amount of informa-
tion which represent fingerprint minutiae. The coefficients with low magni-
tude values represent the less important part of the image [101]. When a
fingerprint image is decomposed using DTCWT, the high-value coefficients
correspond to the minutiae points. Other continuous lines correspond to
low-value DTCWT coefficients. When the watermarked image coefficients
are multiplied by the fingerprint image coefficients, these high values remain
high and the distribution of minutiae points is not changed.
3. In traditional fingerprint touch-based authentication systems, the central
part of the finger is used for matching purposes. In the DTCWT, the image
is decomposed using two sets of 2-D DWTs decomposition, which produces
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extra coefficients. One set of 2-D coefficients represents the real part and
the other set, the imaginary part. The advantage of extra coefficients is that
if changes occur in one coefficient, the other will accommodate this change.
As a result, the final result will not change.
4. The proposed watermarked image is a black-and-white image with large
DTCWT coefficients at the edges, and smaller coefficients at the other
places. The DTCWT has an oversampling property that ensures dense sam-
pling. The watermark coefficients are multiplied by the image coefficients,
only the edge coefficients change greatly whereas the changes in the other
coefficients are much less. In this case, changes to the coefficients do not
appear in the image domain.
3.3.2 Watermark Extraction
To extract the watermark at the receiver end, the following processes are applied
1. Decompose the template image and the watermarked image using DTCWT.
2. Apply the division equation at each level of the DTCWT to inverse the
multiplicative fusion rule in the embedded stage.
W (m ,n) =
1
α [W ′ (m ,n) /(Z ′ (m ,n) + 1)− 1] (3.9)
where W (m ,n) is the watermark coefficient, W
′
(m ,n) is the DTCWT
coefficient for this level of watermarked image, Z
′
(m ,n) is the DTCWT
coefficient for this level of template image stored in the database and α is
the empirical parameter.
3. After obtaining the watermark coefficients for each level, perform the inverse
DTCWT to obtain the watermark.
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3.4 Experimental Results
In the proposed method, 500 fingerprint images (CASIA fingerprint database) are
used which are obtained from 100 fingers (five different images collected for each
finger). One fingerprint image was set as the template and the watermark was
embedded into the other four images. The following presents the experimental
results obtained with the proposed algorithm.
3.4.1 Watermark Effect Investigation
The influence of the embedded watermark on fingerprint images collected from dif-
ferent angles is investigated. Two verification tests were performed on the same
database to prove that the watermarking algorithm does not greatly affect finger-
print minutiae. In the first test, the template image was compared against all
fingerprint sample images for each person without the watermark. In the second
test, the watermark was embedded into all sample images, then, the template image
was compared with all other watermarked images for each person. In both tests, the
comparison was based on the extracted minutiae before and after watermarking.
The results showed that the embedded watermark affect only few minutiae points.
Figure 3.4 shows the extracted minutiae before and after watermarking. These
three images(a, b and c) are collected from different presentation angles for the
same finger to show the effect of the watermark on the fingerprint minutiae. Al-
though the extracted minutiae from these different images, a positive matching
results have been achieved between these images before watermarking. Figure 3.4
(d), (e) and (f) show the extracted minutiae before watermarking where Figure 3.4
(g), (h) and (i) show the extracted minutiae after watermarking. It can be seen
that watermark embedding using the proposed schema cause either missing of few
minutiae or adding few false minutiae. The minutiae points in the boundary are
usually considered as false minutiae. The correctly extracted minutiae and missed
minutiae from watermarked images are illustrated in Figure 3.5. The (original bars)
are the correctly extracted minutiae points from the original images and the (miss-
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ing points)bars are the points that could not be extracted from the watermarked
images. It is apparent that the minutiae points for most images are consistent.
The influence of the embedded watermark on fingerprint minutiae using the
proposed watermarking schema is compared with watermarking method in [1]
based on the number of unaffected minutiae. In order to make a fair comparison,
the same set of fingerprint images are used for both methods. The affected and
unaffected minutiae points are calculated after watermarking. Figure 3.6 shows
the affected minutiae due to the watermark using the proposed DTCWT-based
method are less compared to affected minutiae using the method presented in [1].
As mentioned in section 3.1, at least, 12 minutiae points must be matched to verify
two fingerprint samples are collected from the same finger, the proposed method has
achieved this aim. As shown in Figure 3.7, the unaffected minutiae after watermark
embedding using the method in [1] are less than 12 minutiae points in some cases
because of large number of pixels are manipulated by the embedded watermark.
3.4.2 Genuine and Imposter Evaluation
The verification accuracy performance of the watermarked images obtained
by the DTCWT-based watermarking algorithm was evaluated. The original and
DTCWT watermarked images were compared and similarity scores obtained. The
genuine and imposter test was then performed. A performance evaluation of the
verification system was done based on the matching scores and equal error rate
(EER). In this experiment, 500 images were used to generate matching score of
genuine and imposter.
The distribution of genuine and imposter similarity scores for both original and
DTCWT-watermarked fingerprint images is shown in Figure 3.8. There is little
difference between the watermarked and original histograms but there is an issue
with the boundary between the imposter and genuine score distributions. Ideally,
they would be separated completely to provide confident identification of imposter
images, but in reality the scores show some overlap. Therefore, the distributions
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of other measurements such as EER, false match rate (FMR) and false non-match
rate (FNMR) were evaluated.
The similarity results using FMR and FNMR are shown in Figure 3.9. The lack
of error changes means that the watermarked fingerprint images obtained using
DTCWT-based method can be used for verification purposes. Figure 3.10 shows
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. Although some minutiae points are
missing after embedding the watermark, the watermarking scheme demonstrates
similar performance of the watermarked images compared to correspondence orig-
inal images for a verification system.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a new watermarking algorithm was proposed for fingerprints col-
lected from different presentation angles. Fingerprint and watermark images were
decomposed into real and imaginary wavelet coefficients using DTCWT. The wa-
termark was embedded into the whole fingerprint image, that is, both the real and
imaginary parts. A minutiae-matching algorithm was used to assess the proposed
method’s performance by matching the template and watermarked fingerprint im-
ages. Experiments demonstrated slight changes to minutiae points due to water-
mark, however, affected minutiae points do not affect the matching process. The
verification performance of fingerprint watermarked images obtained by DTCWT-
based algorithm was evaluated in terms of EER, FMR and FNMR , which showed
a substantial improvement in the watermarking process.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
Figure 3.4: (a),(b) and (c) Original images of the same finger collected from
different angles, (d),(e) and (f) extracted minutiae without watermark, (g),(h) and
(i) extracted minutiae with watermarks.
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Figure 3.5: Total extracted minutiae points (Unaffected minutiae bars) and points
that could not be extracted from watermarked images (Affected minutiae bars).
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.6: Extracted minutiae from (a) original images, (b) the proposed water-
marked image and (c) watermarked image in [1].
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Figure 3.7: Number of unaffected minutiae using the proposed method and method
proposed in [1] compare to ordinal extracted minutiae.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.8: Genuine (right bars) and imposter (left bars) similarity scores for (a) original
fingerprint images and (b) images watermarked using the proposed DTCWT method.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.9: FMR vs. FNMR graphs for (a) original fingerprint images, and (b) wa-
termarked images compared with the original fingerprint images. The EER is the point at
which FMR and FNMR have the same error value.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.10: The ROC curve for (a) original fingerprint images, and (b) watermarked
images compared with original fingerprint images.
50 (February 3, 2016)
Chapter4
Watermarking Fingerprint Images
With High Payload
4.1 Introduction
Embedding high payload of a watermarking method refers to the amount of infor-
mation that can be embedded into the host image without significantly damaging
image quality [107]. As discussed in previous chapter, watermarking method has
the advantage of preserving fingerprint minutiae from being significantly affected
by the embedded watermark. However, the major limitation is that the watermark
payload that can be embedded into an image has limited size. In general, high
payload watermarking schemas are desirable for different purposes such as medical
image watermarking [108; 109], owner copyright protection and genuine fingerprint
watermarking [110]. In the proposed watermarking algorithm, the high payload of
the embedded watermark is applied for genuine fingerprint verification purposes.
The high payload of multiple watermarks helps to embed much information into
the fingerprint image which is used later with the fingerprint to verify the authen-
ticity of the claimed person. In this scenario, multiple watermarks of different sizes,
such as a face image of the fingerprint owner and other related unique information
on the owner and the captured device are formed as a text image and are em-
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bedded into the fingerprint image. In this case, the fingerprint and the extracted
watermark are used to validate the claimed person. The higher the size of the
embedded watermark, the more information can be embedded into the fingerprint
of the fingerprint owner. However, embedding high payload into fingerprint image
conflicts with the other basic watermarking requirements such as imperceptibility
and robustness [107; 108]. Preserving fingerprint minutiae from being affected by
the embedded watermark is also essential to the fingerprint watermarking schema
[108]. Therefore, embedding a high payload of watermark into a fingerprint image
while satisfying all three aforementioned requirements is challenging.
Different image watermarking techniques have been used in the literature. Dis-
crete Wavelet Transform (DWT) based methods are more frequently used in digital
image watermarking because of their frequency decomposition characteristics. The
DWT has demonstrated superior performance in terms of robustness and payload
capacity for watermarking images [111; 112]. However, imperceptibility and ro-
bustness are decreased by increasing the payload in DWT. A multi-level DWT can
be used for imperceptibility improvement, but this reduces the robustness and size
of the payload [113]. Further, fingerprint features may be affected by the embed-
ded watermark and this will affect the matching result between the sample and
watermarked fingerprint images.
There are several existing watermarking schemes that embed high payloads of
watermark into fingerprint images. In [9], a two-level DWT transform was used
to embed two watermark images into a fingerprint image. One grayscale facial and
one binary text image were embedded into selected regions of the texture maps of
the two-level DWT transform of the original fingerprint image. The high, medium,
and low pixel intensities of the grayscale facial image were embedded into texture
maps of the medium frequency sub-bands of the second-level DWT. The binary
text image was embedded uniformly into the texture map of the high-frequency
sub-bands of the first-level DWT. The experimental results demonstrated good
performance for identification using both the Human Visual System (HVS) and
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Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) methods. The extracted text
and grayscale facial image watermarks had high quality at the receiving end, as
shown by quality metrics such as the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR), the
Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) and correlation values.
The main limitations to the use of the algorithm in [9] are: (i) the watermarking
procedure is not robust to compression and cropping types of attacks, and (ii)
there are size limitations on the grayscale facial image that can be embedded into a
fingerprint image. The watermarking method using the texture map-based method
has shown only a low level of robustness, because the inverse DWT of the texture
map image with embedded watermarks had values ranging from less than zero
to greater than 255, yet for an image, values must be in the range of 0 to 255.
Negative values therefore are approximated to zero and values larger than 255 are
approximated to 255. During the extraction process, the DWT of that image is
taken and the numbers do not remain the same as their original (actual) values.
There is no way to remove these approximations from this method, which thus
becomes less robust.
This chapter proposes a watermarking method to embed high watermark pay-
loads into fingerprint images with low level of influence on minutiae. Multiple
watermarks are embedded into the owner’s fingerprint image. Both watermark im-
ages carry unique identities of the of fingerprint’s owner. Fingerprint image and
the embedded watermarks are used to prove the genuineness of fingerprint sample
for fingerprint-based authentication system. The implemented method combines
DWT and Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) in a complementary manner to max-
imise the advantages of both schemas. An evaluation of the performance of the new
combined DWT −DCT algorithm is done on a large database of digital fingerprint
images.
The advantages of the proposed watermarking method in this chapter over the
existing method in [9] are summarized as follows:
1. The DCT transform is combined with the DWT to utilize the strength of
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each other which allows to embed larger sizes of facial and text-based images
into fingerprint. The size of the embedded face image is varied between
128 × 128, 80 × 80, and 64 × 64 pixels, whereas the text-based image size
varied between 256× 256, 128× 128 and 96× 96.
2. The DWT −DCT algorithm is robust to several of image processing oper-
ations include JPEG image compression and cropping as shown in Chapter
5.
3. The final watermarked and extracted facial and text images also show bet-
ter results for the computed PSNR, Mean Squared Error (MSE), correlation,
SSIM, and Universal Image Quality Index (UIQI) values on the entire data-
base.
4. The approximations of the negative values in [9] is solved by applying DCT
domain on LH and HL. For each 8×8 DCT-block, the non-zero values of the
quantised DCT matrix are converted to binary and the embedding is imple-
mented through binary data instead of decimal, and thus approximation is
not needed as explained in detail in the following section.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II introduces high
payloads fingerprint watermarking algorithm. The simulation results are presented
in section III. The conclusion is presented in the last section
4.2 A Fingerprint Watermarking Method with High Payloads
The most image energy is concentrated in the low frequency band (LL), thus,
embedding watermark in this band will cause significant degradation of the recon-
structed image. In contrast, the robustness to attacks is affected if the watermark is
embedded into the high frequency band (HH). Therefore, the mid frequency band is
a good choice for watermark embedding to obtain reasonable tradeoff between the
quality of the reconstructed image and the robustness to attacks. In this chapter,
a single-level DWT is performed to obtain the mid-frequency sub-bands LH1 and
HL1 of the host fingerprint image. The DCT algorithm implemented in [114] is
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used for compression, quantisation and conversion purposes to convert a grayscale
image into a compressed binary array of data. The embedding procedure is com-
pleted by taking the inverse DCT of the LH1 and HL1 sub-bands, followed by the
inverse DWT of the resulting image. The extraction steps are similar but in the
reverse order. The watermarked sub-band regions LH1 and HL1 are then indepen-
dently subjected to DCTs to recover the modified DCT coefficients. The key steps
in the algorithm are described in detail below.
Figure 4.1: Embedding two watermarks into a fingerprint image.
4.2.1 Compression and Conversion of the Grayscale Image into a Bi-
nary Image
The DCT-based algorithm is implemented for compression, quantisation and con-
version of the grayscale image to a binary image. The DCT for a 2-D image [115]
is given by Equation (4.1):
D(i, j) = CiCj
M−1∑
xs=0
N−1∑
ys=0
Is(xs, ys) cos
(
ipi
2xs + 1
2M
)
cos
(
jpi
2ys + 1
2N
)
(4.1)
where
Ci =

1√
M
, if i = 0√
2
M , if 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1
(4.2)
55 (February 3, 2016)
CHAPTER 4. WATERMARKING FINGERPRINT IMAGES WITH HIGH PAYLOAD
Cj =

1√
N
, if j = 0√
2
N , if 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1
(4.3)
The intensity of the pixel is calculated for the input image Is in row xs and column
ys which have the dimensions M × N . The D(i, j) refers to the DCT coefficients
in row i and column j of the DCT matrix. The key steps involved in the DCT
algorithm are:
1. Decomposition of the face image into blocks.
The grayscale image is divided into 8×8 blocks as shown in Figure 4.2. Each
block contains 64 values. The DCT is applied to each block, with one block
chosen at a time, proceeding from left to right, top to bottom according to
Equation (4.1). In this step, an 8 × 8 matrix of DCT coefficients for each
block is obtained.
Figure 4.2: 8× 8 pixel blocks of an image for DCT transform.
2. Quantisation of the DCT coefficients.
Each 8 × 8 DCT coefficient matrix is compressed through quantisation by
dividing each obtained matrix by a suitable quantisation matrix of 8×8 pixels
using pixel-by-pixel division. The quantization matrix is chosen based on
the level of compression and quality. The quality levels range from 1 to 100
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[114]. There is a trade-off between quality and compression ratio, Level 1
has the lowest image quality and the best compression ratio, whereas Level
100 has the highest image quality and the lowest compression. A suitable
quantisation matrix at Level 50 is chosen to obtain an excellent balance
between quality and compression.
Q50 =

16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61
12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55
14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56
14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62
18 22 37 56 68 109 103 77
24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92
49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101
72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99

3. Reordering and variable length encoding.
According to the implementation herein , the resulting image has reason-
ably good quality if a maximum of 32 quantised DCT coefficients is selected,
rather than 16. This is because the number of coefficients carries all nec-
essary information with fewer data: below 32, the quality is reduced, while
a higher value introduces redundant information. These 32 coefficients are
chosen from the quantised matrix (QM) and selected in a zigzag manner as
demonstrated in Figure 4.3.
4. Obtaining of the final DCT coefficients.
The quantised DCT coefficients are finally obtained by rounding to the clos-
est integer value according to:
Bj,k = Gj,k {j, k|j = 0, · · · , 7, k = 0, · · · , 7} (4.4)
where Gj,k is the nearest integer. An example of the achieved QM is:
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Figure 4.3: Reading of the DCT matrix in a zigzag manner.
QM =

256 128 −33 7 0 0 0 0
27 55 −2 0 0 0 0 0
13 −7 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

The values obtained in the QM could be any positive or negative value as
the DCT coefficient matrix is divided by the quantisation matrix, hence,
there are values that become very close to zero. After applying a rounding
operation as in Equation 4.4, these values become zero. Only the non-zero
values are saved to achieve a high compression ratio because the remaining
values can be set to zero when decompressing. In the above QM , values will
be read in the sequence: 256, 128, 27, 13, 55,−33, 7,−2,−7,−1.
5. DCT coefficient conversion to a binary form.
For each 8× 8 pixel block, the non-zero values of the quantised DCT matrix
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are converted to binary as shown in Figure 4.4. The first 5 bits indicate
the total number of non-zero bits for this block. As in the above case, there
are 10 non-zero values, so the first 5 bits will be 01010, which is equivalent
to decimal 10. The next 5 bits denote the total number of bits that are
used to represent each value. For example, a value of 256 requires 9 bits, so
the value of the second 5 bits will be 01010, or decimal 10. One extra bit
which is the most significant bit (MSB) will be required to represent the sign
where 0 indicates a positive value and 1 indicates a negative value. Thus,
for example, 256 will be represented as 0100000000, -33 will be represented
as 1000100001, and so on.
Figure 4.4: Binary array of a non-zero DCT coefficient. X represents the required
bits and O is used only if the binary representation of the decimal number require
more bits.
4.2.2 The Embedding Process for Multiple Watermarks
A grayscale image is embedded as the first watermark image, which is converted
to binary as discussed in the previous section. The text-based image is requested
as binary as well, thus, both watermark images are in the form of a binary image.
The compressed binary grayscale image and binary text-based image are embedded
on an 8× 8 block-by-block basis according to the following steps:
1. Obtaining HL1 and LH1 bands of the fingerprint image.
The DCT of HL1 and LH1 are obtained by dividing these mid-frequency
sub-bands into 8 × 8 blocks and the compressed binary watermark images
obtained as above are embedded into each block in the sub-band.
2. Adding a watermark to DCT coefficients.
The embedded bits of watermark images are added to the mid-frequency
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of the DCT coefficients. The compressed and converted-to-binary grayscale
facial image is embedded into the LH1 sub-band, whereas the text given in
the form of a binary image is embedded into the HL1 sub-band. Utilising a
zigzag approach, the watermark bits are embedded in the DCT coefficient
starting from index 25. If there is need for more than one bit in every block,
then coefficients 26, 27 and 28 can be utilised in the process of embedding.
The approximation issue that can reduce the robustness of watermarking al-
gorithms is not a factor in the DWT−DCT method because the embedding
is done through binary data instead of decimal, and thus approximation is
not needed. The integer binary values of 0 and 1 can be expanded to a
broader range of −5 to +5. In this case, it is not important how much −5
changes: as long as it is negative, it shows the correct extracted bit of 0.
Similarly, as long as +5 remains positive, the correct bit +1 is recovered.
This advantage of the DWT −DCT method allows embedding and correct
recovery of larger grayscale images, such as 80× 80 or 128× 128 pixels:
DCT25(x, y) =
−K , bit = 0K , bit = 1 (4.5)
where DCT(x, y) = 25, 26, .. refers to the location of the target pixel and
K indicates the trade-off between robustness and imperceptibility, where a
large value means high robustness and low imperceptibility, and vice versa.
In the proposed watermarking scheme, watermark image sizes vary, which
results in different embedded bits in each block. To solve this problem, zero
bits are added to the end of the watermark message in order to accommodate
the number of the target blocks. These additional bits are ignored in the
extraction process and only watermark bits are obtained.
3. Obtaining the watermarked fingerprint image.
Finally, watermarked fingerprint images are obtained via two main steps.
First, the inverse DCT is determined for each 8× 8 pixel block of LH1 and
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HL1 using Equation 4.6. Second, the final watermarked image is obtained
by determining the inverse IDWT of the obtained image:
Iw(xs, ys) =
M−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
CiCjD(i, j) cos
(
ipi
2xs + 1
2N
)
cos
(
jpi
2ys + 1
2N
)
(4.6)
4.2.3 Watermark Extraction
Watermark extraction involves the reverse of the embedding process. The extracted
data are obtained from the index of 25 and above of the 8 × 8 pixel DCT block.
The binary bits (0’s and 1’s) at any block are calculated according to:
bit =
0 ,DCT(x, y) < 01 ,DCT(x, y) >= 0 (4.7)
The original and the extracted face and text images are shown in the Figure
4.5.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.5: (a) Original face,(b) original text, (c) extracted face and (d) extracted
text images.
4.3 Experimental Validation
A fingerprint is unique to a person because of the uniqueness of its minutiae points
[27]. The main criterion for success in the fingerprint watermarking algorithm is
that minutiae points remain unchanged. To evaluate the proposed DWT −DCT
algorithm, 500 NIST fingerprint images of size 512 × 512 pixels were used. To
quantify the distortion effect of the proposed watermarking algorithm on different
watermark payloads, watermark images of various sizes were considered. In the
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(a) 
   
(b) (c) (d) 
 
 Figure 4.6: (a) The DWT −DCT extraction algorithm, (b) watermarked finger-
print image, and (c, d) extracted face and text images.
proposed algorithm, the mid-frequency bands LH1 and HL1 were used for water-
mark embedding to minimise the chances of affecting low frequency components.
Detailed quantitative testing on a database of fingerprint images was performed
as described below. The JPEG compression technique uses compression of 8 × 8
blocks so the original grayscale image must have used pixel sizes in multiples of
8. Measures such as correlation, the PSNR and MSE were used to determine de-
grees of similarity between the original and watermarked fingerprint images, and
the original text-based and grayscale images with their corresponding extracted
images. Other parameters acting as proxies for the HVS were calculated, including
the SSIM [116] and the UIQI [117]. These results were compared with the results
reported in [9], as shown in Table 4.1.
The PSNR values given by [9] were converted to decibels to allow direct com-
parison with the PSNR values calculated here. According to the results, the values
obtained were reliable. The pixel-level quantitative comparison for all the param-
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Table 4.1: The mean values of mean square error (MSE), PSNR, correlation,
Universal Image Quality Index (UIQI) and Structural Similarity Index (SSIM)
Method Image MSE PSNR Correlation UIQI SSIM
DWT-DCT Watermarked 0.047 27.5 0.994 0.994 0.994
DWT-DCT Extracted face 2.32 29.98 0.992 0.998 0.993
DWT-DCT Extracted text 0.016 37.5 1.0 1.0 1.0
Noore et al. [9] Extracted face 58 18.47 0.986 0.913 0.926
Noore et al. [9] Extracted text 40 17.7 0.864 0.924 0.976
eters being measured provided good values. The MSE value for the extracted
text-based image in the current study was relatively low (see Table 4.1) because
the maximum value of a binary image is 1, rather than the expected 255 for the
grayscale face image. Notably, there was a relatively small difference between the
extracted and the original text-based images.
4.3.1 Watermark Effects on Minutiae
VeriFinger software [118] was used to binarise and thin the fingerprint image to
obtain and enhanced image with accurate ridges and valleys, and intact minutiae
points. The minutiae points were then obtained from all the images to investi-
gate the effect of the embedded watermarks on the minutiae points, as shown in
Figure 4.7. The extracted minutiae points from both the original (triangle) and
watermarked images (circle) were overlaid on the fingerprint image. This made it
apparent that there were shifted points and that one of the minutiae points was
missed when watermarking the image (circle). However, this was considered an
acceptable level of change, as the matching system was able to match these images
without any problems. It is apparent from the findings that the process of embed-
ding watermarks does not affect the number and structure of the valid minutiae
points. Overall, the number of corrupted minutiae was vanishingly small.
The accuracy of a biometric system generally is evaluated by a receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve that shows the false match rate (FMR) and false non-
match rate (FNMR) against biometric samples. FMRs and FNMRs were created
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Missing 
Point 
Figure 4.7: Detected minutiae points in a watermarked image. A missing point
is indicated by a circle.
from the genuine and imposter scores. The zero FMR, FMR1000, FMR100 and
FMR10 were used as a metric to describe the accuracy and performance of matching
scores for watermarked images. These metrics describe the expected FNMR when
the FMR is fixed on 0 (FMR0), 0.1% (FMR1000), 1% (FMR100) and 10% (FMR10)
(see Figure 4.8). A comparison between the original and watermarked images is
provided in Table 4.2, indicating less than 5% FMR in error and less than 0.5% for
EER and FNMR, which illustrates the robustness of the proposed method.
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Figure 4.8: The FMR Vs. FNMR for matching scores between sample and wa-
termarked images.
Table 4.2: FNMR in different ranges of FMR for original and watermarked im-
ages. EER: equal error rate which is a point that FMR=FNMR.
Images EER FMR0 FMR1000 FMR100 FMR10
original 4.63% 30.71% 16.96% 9.28% 3.93%
DWT-DCT 4.98% 34.27% 17.47% 9.65% 3.49%
4.3.2 The Payload’s Influence on Minutiae
To verify that the two embedded watermarks do not affect fingerprint minutiae,
MSE values were calculated between a host image’s pixel values and its correspond-
ing watermarked image after the image had been binarised and thinned (see Table
4.3, second column). The results showed that after binarisation and thinning, the
MSE values were zero in some cases and extremely close to zero in others. These
non-zero values occur because embedding slightly alters the intensity of pixels,
which causes a slight shift of fingerprint lines in either direction. Due to thinning
of the dark pixels in the fingerprint, it is shifted by one step on either side. How-
ever, although this effect produces a non-zero value it does not affect the minutiae.
Visual examination of the original and watermarked images does not detect any de-
formation in the valid minutiae, confirming that valid minutiae are not corrupted
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by the watermarking method.
Table 4.3: Minutiae variation for different fingerprint images.
Images MSE Uncorrupted MP Corrupted MP Uncorrupted %
1 0.02 128 12 91
2 1E-4 94 5 95
3 0 120 4 97
4 6E-4 46 2 96
5 0 66 2 97
The extracted minutiae points (MP) include corrupted and uncorrupted minu-
tiae from the original image, and were compared with the corresponding water-
marked image using two different approaches. First, the grayscale image size was
kept at 64× 64 pixels and the text-based image size at 96× 96 pixels, and five dif-
ferent fingerprint images were used as host images. Second, the fingerprint image
was kept the same while the watermark payloads were varied: that is, the grayscale
image size varied between 128 × 128, 80 × 80, and 64 × 64 pixels, whereas the
text-based image size varied between 256 × 256, 128 × 128 and 96 × 96. Uncor-
rupted minutiae are those that are present in both the original and watermarked
image either without any change or shifted by a maximum of two pixels. Corrupted
minutiae fall into three categories: i) generated due to watermarking, ii) present in
the original image but absent from the watermarked image, and iii) shifted more
than two pixels. The performance of both approaches was evaluated by counting
uncorrupted and corrupted minutiae. The results from the first approach are given
in Table 4.3 and show that 91% - 97% of minutiae remain uncorrupted. Follow-
ing the second approach, the results in Table 4.4 clearly show better performance
compared to algorithm proposed in [9] in terms of number of unaffected minutiae.
In the proposed method, 90% - 98% of minutiae remained uncorrupted compared
to 76% - 86% of minutiae remained uncorrupted using method proposed in [9].
An example of watermarked fingerprint under different payloads are shown in the
Figure 4.9.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.9: Watermarked images under different payloads (a) 64 × 64 face and
96× 96 text images, (b) 80× 80 face and 128× 128 text images, (c) 128× 128 face
and 256× 256 text images.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, a watermarking algorithm was proposed to embed high payloads of
watermark into a fingerprint image by utilising the strengths of the DCT and DWT
techniques and lossless image compression simultaneously. It allows the embedding
of multiple watermarks without corrupting fingerprint features significantly. Dif-
ferent sizes of two images were embedded into the owner’s fingerprint image. The
proposed watermarking algorithm added an authentication factor to the verifica-
tion process for the claimed person. Only slight differences were indicated by the
metrics calculated to quantify the match between the original and watermarked im-
ages, which illustrates that only few minutiae points are affected by the embedding
process.
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Table 4.4: Minutiae variation for different watermark payloads
Grayscale
size
Text-
based
size
Uncorrupted MP Corrupted MP Uncorrupted %
Noore
et al. [9]
DWT-
DCT
Noore
et al. [9]
DWT-
DCT
Noore
et al. [9]
DWT-
DCT
64× 64 96× 96 90 103 15 2 86 98
64× 64 128× 128 88 101 17 4 84 96
64× 64 256× 256 85 100 20 5 81 95
80× 80 96× 96 87 102 18 3 83 97
80× 80 128× 128 85 100 20 5 81 95
80× 80 256× 256 84 99 21 6 80 94
128× 128 96× 96 85 98 20 7 81 93
128× 128 128× 128 81 96 24 9 77 91
128× 128 256× 256 80 95 25 10 76 90
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Chapter5
Robustness Evaluation of the Proposed
Fingerprint Watermarking Algorithms
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, two fingerprint watermarking algorithms
have been implemented. Both proposed watermarking algorithms have been devel-
oped to verify the origin of a fingerprint image; however, they are vulnerable to
several modes of image operation that can affect the security level of the authenti-
cation system. It has recently become apparent that any minor geometric damage
to the watermarked fingerprint image can affect the watermark extraction process
[119]. Thus, the embedded watermarks and fingerprint features that form the ba-
sis of authentication systems can be damaged. Indeed, robustness of watermark
schemes to common image processing operations and geometric attack is essential
for such systems.
In general, attacks on watermarks can be divided into two groups: unintentional
and intentional attacks. Unintentional attacks can occur during normal signal pro-
cessing operations such as printing, scanning, compression, transcoding, filtering,
noise, gamma correction, geometric transforms and cropping [120; 121]. For exam-
ple, rotation or scaling can change pixel values and destroy watermark data. Also,
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images are generally stored in lossy compressed format, which takes up less stor-
age space. These compressions separate important from unimportant parts of the
data and discard the unimportant parts, but the resulting distortion may damage
watermark data. Therefore, a simple attack involves compressing images in a lossy
way and destroying the watermark. Rotation or scaling can change pixel values
and damage watermarks while preserving the visual content of the image. Signal
processing operations such as quantisation, decompression, re-sampling, colour re-
duction, swapping some pixels and so on can also damage watermark data, as can
adding noise. During an intentional attack, a person can destroy inserted water-
mark data or crop an image to copy it.
To proceed further, it is necessary to define the meaning of geometric damage as
caused by the most common image operations (translation, rotation and scaling).
Clearly, the extractor must be able to extract an embedded watermark if it exists.
For some watermarking algorithms, robustness in the face of scaling is examined
by adding the watermark at particular scale and then changing the image size. On
the extraction side, the extractor scales the image back to the original size before
extracting the embedded watermark. However, in this method, the extractor has no
information on the pre-scaled size and will not able to scale the image back to the
original size. In a similar way, rotation evaluation is based on rotating the image by
a particular amount and then rotating in the opposite direction, but the detector
has insufficient information about the rotation angle. The same issue occurs during
translation evaluation.
Although a range of robust watermarking schemes have been proposed, none
has been found to meet all requirements simultaneously. Even minor geometric
distortion can lead to failure in detecting watermarks [119]. Ratha et al. in [122]
discussed eight types of image operations that can affect watermarking images. For
example, fingerprint images transferred over the network are vulnerable to image
operations that can decrease the performance of the biometric authentication sys-
tem. Thus, in order to have accurate authentication it is necessary to ensure that
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the fingerprint image is secure and not corrupted. A watermarking algorithm for
fingerprint images has been proposed [84] that embeds a facial image into the fin-
gerprint image using least significant bit (LSB) and wavelet-based approaches. In
general, the wavelet-based approach is robust to frequency attacks whereas LSB is
vulnerable to geometric attacks. The recognition accuracy of the proposed algor-
ithm here is evaluated under different types of image operation, including JPEG
2000 compression, Gaussian noise, median filtering, cropping, resizing, rotation,
and transformation. Vatsa et al. [123] used four types of watermarking algorithms
using a facial image as the cover image and an iris code as the watermark for multi-
biometric verification. Different types of image operation were used in order to
evaluate the robustness of the method. Recently, Vatsa et al. [124] introduced a
biometric watermarking scheme involving three-level redundant Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT) that embeds voice MFC coefficients into a colour facial image.
Using this algorithm they experimented with the use of adaptive user-specific wa-
termarking parameters to enhance the performance of the embedding technique.
The robustness of the algorithm was high to some frequency and geometric at-
tacks. Another technique was presented by Noore et al. [9] to embed face and
text images into fingerprint images as multiple watermarks to verify the integrity
of a fingerprint image and to ensure that the fingerprint image is not corrupted.
The proposed algorithm utilised the DWT technique to embed the watermark im-
ages. A multimodal watermarking method was proposed by Vatsa et al. (2006)
for fingerprint images using the DWT and LSB techniques. In this method, the
author embedded vectors of a facial image into a fingerprint image to demonstrate
the lack of corruption of the fingerprint image. The robustness of the watermarking
algorithms proposed here to common image operations is evaluated in this chapter.
This includes a description of the effects of these operations on the watermarked
fingerprint images. The experimental results are evaluated using image quality
metrics. Results showed that the proposed algorithms are robust to most forms of
image processing attack.
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5.2 The Most Common Image Processing Operations
The robustness of watermarking algorithms to some types of image processing op-
erations can be evaluated. This includes image compression, image translation,
image resizing or scaling, sharpening, rotation, cropping and salt-and-pepper noise
[120; 125]. Image compression is the main type of image processing attack. Com-
pression of an image is mainly required when saving or transferring it. This process
reduces the number of bits per pixel, which will affect any embedded watermarks.
Image resizing may be done to reduce storage size, or the image might be scaled
to display size. Image noise can be created when an image is scanned, which may
affect the watermark by changing the value of several pixel intensities in spatial
domains. Watermarks can be removed intentionally or unintentionally by simple
image processing operations like contrast or brightness enhancement or gamma cor-
rection, for instance. Thus, watermarks should be robust to a variety of such image
operations. In the current study, watermarked images are attacked using different
image processing operations and the watermarks reconstructed from the attacked
images. In this chapter, the watermarked fingerprint images and the reconstructed
watermark quality in Chapter 3 (DTCWT-based method) and Chapter 4 (DWT-
DCT method) are evaluated using standard image quality metrics (e.g. PSNR,
SSIM and UIQI). Two watermarks are embedded into the fingerprint image using
DWT −DCT that are grayscale fiscal image and text image as explained in detail
in the previous chapter. In DTCWT algorithm, only one watermark is embed-
ded in the fingerprint image as explained. The grayscale fiscal image is resized to
64× 64 pixels before being used as a watermark. The second watermark is unique
text that can be either key text or a secure ID code. The NIST database is used
for the following experiments.
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5.3 Robustness Evaluation of DWT−DCT Method Compared to DTCWT
Method
5.3.1 Image Compression
The JPEG image compression technique was used with compression ratios varying
from 10 to 80. The first three rows in Figure 5.1 represent the compressed water-
marked fingerprint, reconstructed face and reconstructed text images respectively
of DWT −DCT method. It is evident that the watermarks can be extracted even
with a low factor of compression, meaning that fewer bits are used to compress the
image. Further, the quality of the extracted text is better than that for the facial
images because one bit is used for the text compared to 8 bits for the image. The
two bottom rows are according to the DTCWT technique where the text-based wa-
termark extracted from images resulting from different compression ratios. Overall,
DWT −DCT watermarks are more robust than those produced using the DTCWT
technique, but the latter performs better with low-quality images.
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Figure 5.1: Compression operation: the first three rows show watermarked fin-
gerprint and extracted watermarks using the DWT −DCT technique and the two
bottom rows are from the DTCWT technique.
Table 5.1 provides the image quality metrics for the compressed watermarked
images, extracted facial images and extracted text images after compression attack
for both methods. According to the simulation results of DWT − DCT method,
it can be seen that the extracted text image after JPEG compression attack is
better than the face image. This is because the DCT is the core component of the
JPEG compression, so that applying DCT to a DCT-transformed image greatly
degraded the quality of the embedded watermark. In addition, since watermarks
were embedded in the 25th DCT, if the quality factor for image compression is more
than 25, it has less effect on the extracted watermark. It can be seen also that the
the extracted text image of DWT −DCT method is is better than the extracted
text image of DTCWT .
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Table 5.1: JPEG compression on watermarked fingerprint images. Inf: the PSNR
is infinite, which means there has been no change in the image.
Ratio Image PSNR SSIM UIQI Correlation
10
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 23.4872 0.6992 0.9800 0.9533
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 4.134 0.020174 0.011895 0.023532
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 6.6203 0.11464 0.18198 0.33011
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 21.2354 0.5942 0.9756 0.9366
Extracted text (DTCWT) 6.0012 0.10012 0.17532 0.29978
20
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 24.7644 0.7699 0.9797 0.9655
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 4.8726 0.042699 0.0475 0.087193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 12.0273 0.24494 0.50707 0.67261
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 22.5644 0.6233 0.9645 0.9456
Extracted text (DTCWT) 8.5856 0.19885 0.35478 0.45112
30
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 25.9463 0.82736 0.98112 0.97388
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 5.7248 0.098286 0.12341 0.21406
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 15.1621 0.40918 0.6913 0.79892
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 24.0547 0.75895 0.9755 0.95361
Extracted text (DTCWT) 9.8654 0.25985 0.3856 0.58644
40
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 27.1046 0.86443 0.97979 0.98014
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 8.6789 0.26997 0.31831 0.42092
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 18.8513 0.68133 0.84357 0.90349
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 24.9878 0.78564 0.92451 0.96875
Extracted text (DTCWT) 10.8561 0.30124 0.42351 0.75612
50
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 28.1383 0.88825 0.98441 0.98434
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 11.3479 0.48373 0.52944 0.61632
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 28.6817 0.95195 0.98085 0.9888
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 23.9563 0.71235 0.94321 0.96932
Extracted text (DTCWT) 11.7856 0.35642 0.49562 0.78326
60
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 29.2628 0.91503 0.98769 0.98791
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 15.1275 0.68445 0.77393 0.80727
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 24.895 0.75644 0.96332 0.96558
Extracted text (DTCWT) 12.564 0.38965 0.52663 0.79568
70
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 30.7596 0.9377 0.99155 0.99143
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.4479 0.89019 0.99964 0.98126
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 26.2452 0.79875 0.9823 0.97825
Extracted text (DTCWT) 12.9985 0.45986 0.59632 0.86341
80
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 33.1977 0.96243 0.99537 0.99511
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5411 0.89353 1.0007 0.98168
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 27.367 0.85632 0.9878 0.98021
Extracted text (DTCWT) 14.8564 0.56233 0.65336 0.89647
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5.3.2 Cropping Operation
For cropping operation, the watermarked image was cropped in terms of image
size. Here, the fingerprint images were cropped to 64,128 and 256 pixels. Figure
5.2 provides an example of a cropping operation: the face and text watermarks are
recognisable even when the cropped image is large. The simulation results illustrate
a cropping operation on watermarked fingerprint images using theDWT−DCT and
DTCWT techniques, and suggests that cropping has an effect on both methods
and thus cannot be ignored. However, DWT − DCT performs better for text
watermarks than does the DTCWT technique.
Figure 5.2: Cropping operation: the first three rows are the watermarked fin-
gerprint and extracted watermarks using the DWT −DCT technique and the two
bottom rows are from the DTCWT technique.
Quality metrics for different cropping operations are given in Table 5.2. The
results demonstrate that the algorithm is resistant to cropping operations, however,
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by increasing the cropping size, some parts of the extracted watermark is missed
and it is not possible to retrieve the data from the watermarked image.
Table 5.2: Image cropping operation for watermarked fingerprint images.
Pixels Image PSNR SSIM UIQI Correlation
64
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 20.5084 0.98257 0.88335 0.91357
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 14.5349 0.80294 0.74278 0.79022
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 32.3696 0.98713 0.99082 0.99508
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 18.5624 0.95654 0.83451 0.89564
Extracted text (DTCWT) 26.6584 0.96542 0.97564 0.97412
128
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 15.6192 0.93457 0.68733 0.7737
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 12.5317 0.71925 0.61442 0.69092
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 23.1644 0.97124 0.98585 0.95998
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 13.8574 0.90456 0.60785 0.69875
Extracted text (DTCWT) 18.6632 0.9563 0.96321 0.92348
256
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 11.3048 0.74502 0.44541 0.62406
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 9.7162 0.5427 0.3924 0.50017
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 17.2145 0.88893 0.9648 0.83411
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 10.9865 0.68321 0.35896 0.51326
Extracted text (DTCWT) 10.6521 0.75254 0.36547 0.68257
5.3.3 Sharpen Filter
A sharpen filter operation was also used to evaluate the robustness of the DWT −
DCT and DTCWT watermarking techniques. Figure 5.3 illustrates the effect of
sharpen filters on a watermarked images, and Table 5.3 provides the related quality
metrics. It is apparent that the watermarked fingerprint are not affected by sharpen
filters. However, the reconstructed text image is affected more by the higher value.
Overall, the DWT − DCT technique proved to be more robust to sharpen filter
operation than was the DTCWT technique.
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Figure 5.3: The sharpen filter operation: the first three rows are the watermarked
fingerprint and extracted watermarks using the DWT−DCT technique and the two
bottom rows are from the DTCWT technique.
78 (February 3, 2016)
CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED FINGERPRINT
WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS
Table 5.3: Sharpen filter operation on watermarked fingerprint images. The values
in the table indicate the strength of the sharpening effect; a higher value leads to
larger increase in the contrast of the sharpened pixels. Inf: the PSNR ratio is
infinite, which means no change has occurred to the image.
Amount Image PSNR SSIM UIQI Correlation
0.5
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 30.7222 0.96719 0.94071 0.99338
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 0.9937 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 27.4567 0.95471 0.92564 0.98254
Extracted text (DTCWT) 26.546 0.97254 0.93658 0.91654
1
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 25.0077 0.90275 0.876 0.97755
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 1.0037 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 21.2545 0.88325 0.82654 0.94267
Extracted text (DTCWT) 18.5247 0.80112 0.79336 0.78996
3
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 16.9056 0.66929 0.66625 0.89147
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 1.0037 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 19.8686 0.85124 0.80546 0.91785
Extracted text (DTCWT) 9.2647 0.42365 0.40211 0.38665
5
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 13.8788 0.54019 0.54281 0.81624
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 1.0037 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 18.0245 0.84142 0.78241 0.90135
Extracted text (DTCWT) 5.2780 0.35845 0.23584 0.2514
5.3.4 Noise Attacks
The Gaussian noise has a normal probability density function that is mathemati-
cally defined by:
In(z) =
1√
2piσ
exp[−1
2
(
z − µ
σ
)2] cos(ωtt) (5.1)
where z is the pixel value in location (x, y), µ and σ are the mean and the standard
deviation of the Gaussian distribution. This Gaussian noise was added to water-
marked images with different density (σ). Figure 5.4 shows the effect of Gaussian
noise at different densities. In DWT −DCT method, the Gaussian noise affected
the reconstructed watermarks if the noise density increased to 0.5, although it
was still possible to see some text. However, the reconstructed text image of the
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DTCWT method is affected more by the higher value.
Figure 5.4: Gaussian attack with different noises: the first three rows are based
on the DWT −DCT technique and the two bottom rows are based on the DTCWT
technique. The ’amount’ value indicates the variance of the Gaussian noise with
zero mean.
From Table 5.4, it can be seen that the noise affects the watermarks when the
noise density is high, as the DCT coefficient is affected by noise. Further, as the
face image is embedded in the HL band and the noise is actually affecting the high
frequency, the extracted face watermark is more sensitive to noise than is the text
watermark. The DWT − DCT method appears more robust to Gaussian noise
than is the DTCWT technique.
80 (February 3, 2016)
CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED FINGERPRINT
WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS
Table 5.4: Gaussian noise attack on watermarked fingerprint images. The values
shown in the table indicate the variance, , of the Gaussian noise with zero mean.
Inf: the PSNR is infinite, which means there has been no change in the image.
Density Image PSNR SSIM UIQI Correlation
0.001
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 30.12 0.93055 0.98625 0.99013
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5981 0.89743 0.9937 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 28.254 0.92854 0.96542 0.97214
Extracted text (DTCWT) 9.5641 0.3236 0.35412 0.46524
0.01
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 20.2464 0.63571 0.85491 0.91229
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 7.4228 0.15341 0.22617 0.33814
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 16.1922 0.51345 0.73505 0.84038
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 15.5641 0.4658 0.59652 0.69365
Extracted text (DTCWT) 3.2652 0.00140 0.12451 0.15424
0.05
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 13.8464 0.30843 0.55548 0.70473
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 4.7994 0.041445 0.041974 0.077413
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 7.4624 0.14436 0.22756 0.38958
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 11.3254 0.29254 0.45235 0.61325
Extracted text (DTCWT) 1.5461 0.01654 0.0325 0.02541
Salt-and-pepper noise was added to watermarked images and the performance of
the extraction algorithm analysed by increasing the densities of the noise from 0.01
up to 0.1. Figure 5.5 illustrates the effect of salt-and-pepper noise with densities
of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10. The effect of this noise is approximated by the density
multiplied by the total number of pixels in the image.
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Figure 5.5: Salt-and-pepper noise attack with different densities. The ’amount’
value is the noise density multiplied by the total number of pixels. The first three
rows are according to the DWT − DCT technique and the two bottom rows are
according to the DTCWT technique.
Table 5.5 provides image quality metrics for different noise densities, demon-
strating that the extracted text watermarks perform better than extracted face
watermarks. Based on the reconstructed text images, the DWT − DCT method
appears more robust to salt-and-pepper noise than the DTCWT technique.
5.3.5 Image Rotation and Resizing
The rotation operation was achieved by changing the angle by 10 ◦, 30 ◦, 45 ◦ or
60 ◦. The rotation operator performs a geometric transform that maps the position
[x, y] of an image element in an input image onto a position [x′, y′] in an output
image, by rotating it through a user-specified angle θ. In most implementations,
82 (February 3, 2016)
CHAPTER 5. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED FINGERPRINT
WATERMARKING ALGORITHMS
Table 5.5: Impulsive (salt-and-pepper) noise attack on watermarked fingerprint
images.
Amount Image PSNR SSIM UIQI Correlation
0.01
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 25.1362 0.89973 0.95012 0.96974
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 14.5401 0.68832 0.72089 0.80441
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 23.0851 0.89698 0.92984 0.96131
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 24.3251 0.86325 0.92357 0.94287
Extracted text (DTCWT) 13.2357 0.74265 0.84784 0.90736
0.05
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 18.1416 0.62432 0.78645 0.86399
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 5.7109 0.069368 0.093452 0.15768
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 12.2588 0.29929 0.52132 0.68414
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 15.6478 0.55478 0.69213 0.80475
Extracted text (DTCWT) 9.9875 0.20564 0.4625 0.53147
0.1
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 15.1495 0.4368 0.63838 0.75737
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 4.937 0.044902 0.052874 0.096531
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 8.6617 0.17876 0.29817 0.47308
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 13.4781 0.38475 0.54178 0.65325
Extracted text (DTCWT) 7.9865 0.10256 0.23145 0.36547
output locations [x′, y′] that are outside the boundary of the image are ignored.
Rotation is most commonly used to improve the visual appearance of an image
[126], although it can be useful as a pre-processor in applications where directional
operators are involved. Rotation is a special case of affine transformation. The
rotation operator performs a transformation of the form:
x′
y′
 =
cosθ −sinθ
sinθ cosθ
x− x0
y − y0
+
x0
y0
 (5.2)
where [x0, y0] are the coordinates of the centre of rotation (in the input image) and
θ is the angle of rotation, with clockwise rotations having positive angles. Note
here that image coordinates are used, so values on the y-axis are descending. A
similar rotation formula can be defined to make values ascend on the y-axis. Even
more so than the translation operation, the rotation operation produces output
locations [x′, y′] that do not fit within the boundaries of the image (as defined by
the dimensions of the original input image). In such cases, destination elements
that have been mapped outside the image are ignored by most implementations.
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Pixel locations out of which an image has been rotated are usually filled in with
black pixels. Rotation operations were performed on DWT −DCT and DTCWT
watermarked images. The outcomes of a rotation operation are illustrated in Figure
5.6: by rotating the image, some parts of the watermark have altered pixel values.
As the watermark techniques are not rotation invariant, the rotated image was
realigned either manually or by using angle estimation between the attacked image
and the source image. The data in Table 5.6 demonstrate that the rotation does
not have any effect on text watermarks, but this is not true for face watermarks.
The rotation slightly altered the watermarks from both methods.
Figure 5.6: Rotation operation: the first three rows using the DWT − DCT
technique and the two bottom rows are from the DTCWT technique.
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Table 5.6: Rotation operation on watermarked fingerprint images.
Degree Image PSNR SSIM UIQI Correlation
10
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 13.374 0.80992 0.56234 0.58877
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 7.5857 0.33022 0.24165 0.35191
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 18.1835 0.78086 0.81454 0.89208
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 13.654 0.79565 0.55231 0.50124
Extracted text (DTCWT) 15.6541 0.75245 0.79541 0.86448
30
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 10.6944 0.74673 0.31433 0.35353
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 6.2683 0.28213 0.15726 0.25517
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 17.9703 0.75809 0.82189 0.88168
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 9.9654 0.71254 0.29856 0.31547
Extracted text (DTCWT) 17.1241 0.72356 0.81247 0.87451
45
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 10.3399 0.73314 0.28069 0.31967
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 5.9483 0.27022 0.12792 0.21074
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 17.607 0.73271 0.80896 0.87208
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 9.5641 0.70251 0.27541 0.28654
Extracted text (DTCWT) 15.3561 0.70265 0.79542 0.84251
60
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 10.6724 0.74682 0.31221 0.35154
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 6.1374 0.25468 0.13152 0.2118
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) 18.7922 0.77222 0.83955 0.90322
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 8.9987 0.70241 0.26584 0.27658
Extracted text (DTCWT) 14.6542 0.69654 0.76251 0.82654
A resizing operation was performed with both watermarking image methods,
for comparison. Resizing the image changed the value of the image pixels, as can
be seen in Figure 5.7. The results in Table 5.7 demonstrate that resizing had no
significant effect on either type of watermarked image.
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Figure 5.7: Image resizing operation: the first three rows are bassed on the DWT−
DCT technique and the two bottom rows are based on the DTCWT technique.
These results suggest that the DWT − DCT is robust in the face of attacks
and that the watermarks can be extracted from distorted watermarked fingerprints.
However, if the image is heavily distorted, for example by a large amount of noise
or low-quality image compression, it is not possible to reconstruct its watermarks.
Further, text watermarks are more robust to attacks than are face watermarks.
Therefore, the text watermark can still be extracted from fingerprint affected by
heavy attack. For comparison, the DWT − DCT watermarking method is more
robust that the DTCWT method based on the watermarked fingerprint images
and the reconstructed text images.
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Table 5.7: The effect of image resizing operation on watermarked fingerprint im-
ages, for resizing factors of 2, 4, 6 and 8. Inf: the PSNR is infinite, which means
there has been no change in the image.
Factor Image PSNR SSIM UIQI Correlation
2
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 32.163 0.95881 0.99874 0.99396
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 0.9937 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 31.3251 0.94362 0.98325 0.99396
Extracted text (DTCWT) 24.1254 0.92365 0.93254 0.94152
4
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 32.3868 0.96106 0.99832 0.99427
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 0.99863 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 31.1254 0.94325 0.95362 0.96254
Extracted text (DTCWT) 22.3251 0.90545 0.89554 0.90144
6
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 32.3979 0.96125 0.99856 0.99429
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 0.99863 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 30.654 0.95221 0.94325 0.96112
Extracted text (DTCWT) 20.2650 0.89554 0.87554 0.88663
8
Fingerprint (DWT-DCT) 32.3999 0.96123 0.99812 0.99414
Extracted face (DWT-DCT) 25.5988 0.89752 0.99863 0.98193
Extracted text (DWT-DCT) Inf 1 1 1
Fingerprint (DTCWT) 29.897 0.95121 0.93521 0.95451
Extracted text (DTCWT) 19.2651 0.87564 0.86251 0.86113
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the effect of image processing operations on watermarked finger-
print images was discussed in detail. The effects of different image operations on
both watermarking techniques that are presented in the previous chapters were ex-
plained and the effects were clearly evident in the images. It can be seen that the
DWT − DCT technique performed better than DTCWT technique when under
image processing operations. Overall, the results show that the proposed methods
are robust to a range of common image operations.
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Multiple Identifiers Watermarking
Schema for Touchless Fingerprint
Image
6.1 Introduction
With the advances in computing capability and the connectivity of mobile devices,
users may gain access to services at any time from any place [127]. Recently,
there has been a revolution in mobile technologies that has resulted in growing
mobile commerce applications. Westpac, one of the big four banks in Australia,
has announced that half of its ’digitally active’ users are banking on their mobile
devices, generating 50 billion dollars in transactions each year [128]. However,
industry estimates suggest that hundreds of thousands of portable mobile devices
are misplaced or stolen every year [129]. This increases the risk of bank transfers
being conducted by unauthorised persons, who may also disclose private data to
unwanted parties. To date, authentication for mobile device applications has de-
pended mainly on passwords. This process is vulnerable to the serious problem of
password robbery or surreptitious use. Mobile biometrics is expected to link the
genuine user to a claimed identity in ubiquitous applications. An individual fake
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fingerprint that cracked the sensor on an iPhone 5S [130] addresses the fact that
biometrics are not secret and they are only a representation of a person. Hackers
can simply lift prints from the side of a mobile device to gain unauthorised access to
a user’s mobile device and data. Researchers report several ways to attack Android
devices remotely and extract stored fingerprints without a user’s awareness, such
as by ’fingerprint sensor spying attack’. Due to the low level of security in mobile
devices, reliable fingerprint-based authentication processes become a challenge. A
Science news article entitled ’passwords are pass but biometrics is not mobile’ cor-
rectly identifies that mobile biometrics technology is not yet sufficiently mature for
use in real-world applications [131].
Based on the state of the art, several techniques have been proposed for gen-
uine fingerprint authentication [78; 79; 81; 84; 132]. The distortions introduced
to fingerprint image quality are not significant and are imperceptible [133; 67].
Although these methods were capable of embedding watermarks in a fingerprint
image and the quality of the image did not change, studies have not investigated
the effect of watermarks on the minutiae.
A mobile identity (M-identity) which includes both identities of a user and
his/her bound mobile device is used as an additional factor of authentication [134].
Recently, different watermarking algorithms have been proposed for color images
captured by mobile camera [135; 136]. In [135], DCT-based watermarking schema
was proposed to embed international mobile number into a color image. Each
mobile decimal digit is converted into 4 bits to form the watermark message. Then,
each bit is embedded into one low frequency coefficient of one of the DCT blocks
of the host color image. The proposed method showed a high PSNR values and
was robust to JPEG compression operation. Jeedella et al. in [136] convert mobile
number into binary and then is combined with checksum bits to form binary vector.
The binary vector is then encoded using Reed Solomon Error Correction Code and
converted again into binary matrix to form the watermark pattern. The color
image is divided into 8 × 8 blocks using DCT technique. The watermark bits are
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then embedded into one of the DCT coefficients of the 8× 8 blocks. The influence
of the embedded watermark on the color images is investigated using the PSNR
and SSIM. The proposed algorithm is found robust against JPEG compression and
proposed better performance to the case without using error correction code.
However, both aforementioned color-based image watermarking methods are
not applicable to be applied for fingerprint image that captured by mobile camera.
Fingerprint image is not like any other color image because it contains minutiae
points that represent its uniqueness. Embedding watermark into color fingerprint
image using the proposed methods in [135] and [136] can corrupt minutiae because
the watermark is embedded into each DCT block. To avoid affecting minutiae, a
new DCT-based watermarking method is proposed in this chapter to embed wa-
termark into DCT block that contains only two minutiae points or less. Other
blocks that contain more than two minutiae will be ignored. This will reduce the
effect of watermarks on the minutiae points. In the proposed watermarking schema,
the watermark is text-related information which constructed based on integrating
multiple identifiers relating to both the capturing device and its owner. The wa-
termark message is first concatenated, and then hashed. A digital watermarking
technology is employed to coin the hashed output into the fingerprint of the user.
This coined identity entity has the advantage of fake fingerprint prevention and
consequent secure identification and authentication. This method has the potential
to be used in mobile access control in which part of the text data is generated
from hard-coded mobile device information and fingerprint image are acquired by
a mobile camera. The simulation results show low level of influence caused by the
proposed watermarking method. Also, it shows better performance based on PSNR,
MSE, correlation, SSIM, and UIQI values compared to watermarking methods in
[135; 136]. The proposed algorithm is explained in the following sections.
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6.2 Camera-based Colour Fingerprint Image Acquisition and Enhance-
ment
A fingerprint image is acquired using a mobile camera. Data acquisition is a process
whereby the real-time input of a fingerprint from the mobile camera is read into
the CPU for processing. A close-up shot is required to capture the fingerprint
image. This makes the depth of field small. Therefore, the fingerprint region is in
focus and the background region is out of focus. This produces clear ridge pattern
images in the fingerprint region and blurred pattern images in the background
region [137]. Almost all modern mobile products are already equipped with colour
cameras. These cameras are comparable in quality to commercial digital cameras
because they possess features such as zooming, auto-focusing, and high resolution.
However, there are some challenging issues when developing fingerprint recognition
systems that use a mobile camera. First, the contrast between the ridges and the
valleys in images obtained with a mobile camera is low. Second, because the depth
of field of the camera is small, some parts of the fingerprint region are in focus but
some are not. Third, the nature of the background, or non-finger region, in mobile
camera images is highly variable depending on how the image is captured in time
and space. Here, the processes of fingerprint image acquisition, minutiae feature
extraction, matching, and finally watermarking for camera-based fingerprint images
are explained in detail. Figure 6.1 shows an example of a fingerprint image captured
by a mobile camera.
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Figure 6.1: Raw colour fingerprint image captured by a mobile camera.
The proposed watermarking schema in this chapter embeds the watermark bits
into the DCT blocks. To obtain DCT blocks, the colour image is converted to a
grayscale image, and normalisation and de-trending processes are applied to further
enhance the grayscale image. Figure 6.2 shows the grayscale and enhanced images.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.2: (a) Normal fingerprint grayscale image and (b) enhanced fingerprint image.
Two-dimensional Fourier analysis is applied to reduce noise in the grayscale
image. Since the image has different lighting and saturation conditions in different
regions, the Fourier analysis is at first applied to a small block consisting of 12x12
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square pixels and then again at 96x96 square pixels. During this Fourier analysis,
the following formulae are used to transform and then reconstruct the image:
F (u, v) =
M−1∑
x=0
N−1∑
y=0
F (x, y)e−j2pi(
ux
M
+ vy
N
) (6.1)
F−1 {F (u, v)} = f(x, y) = 1
MN
M−1∑
u=0
N−1∑
v=0
F (u, v) ∗ ej2pi(uxM + vyN ) (6.2)
g(x, y) = F−1
{
F (u, v) ∗ |F (u, v)|k
}
(6.3)
Here M,N = 12 and 96 for the two stages discussed above. g(x, y) is the
reconstructed image and F denotes the Fourier transform of a pixel at (x, y).
Fingerprint segmentation is necessary to eliminate the undesirable background
noise and reduce the size of the input data [138]. The segmentation of the fin-
gerprint is determined by adaptive thresholding and morphological processing. An
example of a segmented fingerprint is shown in Figure 6.3.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.3: (a) An example of a colour fingerprint captured by a mobile camera and (b)
binary image converted from grayscale image.
After image segmentation, the cropped fingerprint is converted from RGB to
grayscale and then used for edge detection and minutiae extraction. For minutiae
extraction, it is necessary to identify the ridge lines from the fingerprint image.
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These ridge lines in a camera-based fingerprint are clearly visible, but some parts
are either dark or saturated, which makes it difficult to detect ridge lines using
image processing techniques. To overcome this problem, histogram equalisation is
used to improve the quality of the regions in question. Then, a binary image is
created from the grayscale image. A binary image is shown in Figure 6.3, in which
it can be seen that the binarised ridge lines in the focused region are clear, whereas
the unfocused regions are unclear and are problematic. Therefore, these areas need
to be filtered or ignored for matching purposes.
6.3 Concatenation of Text-based Information of both a Mobile Device
and its Owner
There are two physical components in mobile biometrics: the biometric of the owner
(a fingerprint image) and text-based information, which includes the user’s name,
their unique ID and date of birth, the hard-coded serial number of the camera
and SIM card, and the International Mobile Equipment Identity number of the
mobile device. The text information for both the owner and the capturing device
is concatenated as a unique entity Et = QtCt where Qt represents the text-based
identifier of the owner and Ct the text-related information about the capturing
device. As shown in Figure 6.4, a hash function SHA− 256, is then applied to Et,
and a digest with fixed length output, W1=Hash(Et), is produced. The digest can
be used as an index at the server side of mobile applications where privacy could
be maintained with the zero-knowledge identification.
Figure 6.4: Personal information (watermark pattern) conversion and encoding
flowchart.
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6.4 Watermarking Colour Fingerprints Based on Selected Blocks
The multiple identifiers are integrated by embedding the hashed text-related infor-
mation about the mobile device and its owner into the fingerprint image. Smart
phones currently have significant computational capability. During the process of
fingerprint acquisition using a mobile camera, imperceptible digital watermarks are
embedded in the fingerprint image at the instance of acquisition using an inbuilt
function in the mobile device. The hashed text-related data are converted to binary
for watermark construction, and then are embedded into the binarised fingerprint
image. The process of the embedding schema is depicted in Figure 6.5.
Mobile 
Device
User
Hash text-related data
Capturing fingerprint 
image via mobile camera
Enhancing color 
touch-less fingerprint image
DCT-based 
watermarking 
algorithm
Watermarkt
Integrated 
entity
Figure 6.5: Integration of the unique entity from the mobile device and its owner.
In the proposed approach, a DCT-based algorithm is developed to embed a
watermark message into a fingerprint image. The main aim is to keep the influence
of the watermark on minutiae at low level to achieve a higher similarity between
the original and watermarked images. The algorithm has the following steps:
1. Perform the DCT operation on 8× 8 block of the image.
2. Identify the blocks where the maximum number of minutiae points is two.
3. Embed the watermark message into the selected blocks only.
4. Perform the inverse DCT operation.
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6.4.1 Performing the DCT Operation on 8x8 Block of Image
DCT is a very popular transform that transforms an image to a frequency domain.
Here, DCT is performed on the original fingerprint image. The image is divided
into 8× 8 blocks and the DCT is applied on each block. The DCT and its inverse
approach can be expressed as follows, with DCT forward transform given as:
Ci =

1√
M
, if i = 0√
2
M , if 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1
(6.4)
Cj =

1√
N
, if j = 0√
2
N , if 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1
(6.5)
D(i, j) = CiCj
M−1∑
xs=0
N−1∑
ys=0
Is(xs, ys) cos
(
ipi
2xs + 1
2M
)
cos
(
jpi
2ys + 1
2N
)
(6.6)
here Is(xs, ys) is the sub-image of an original image in spatial domain, I(x, y),
where {x, y|1 < x < w, 1 < y < h}, where w and h are the width and height of
the image. C is the DCT coefficient, M and N is the block size, and i and j are
the indices in the frequency domain. The DCT allows an image to be broken into
square clocks. The fingerprint image is divided into 8 × 8 blocks (M = N = 8).
Watermark message are embedded into the blocks that have two minutiae points
or less.
6.4.2 Selecting Target Blocks
The watermark message is embedded into the blocks that have two minutiae points
or less. In this case, the maximum number of minutiae points in a block to be
chosen for watermark embedding is two. The blocks that contain more than two
minutiae are avoided at watermarking. In this case, only few minutiae points may
be affected by the watermark embedding process. The main purpose of this step is
to preserve large number of minutiae from being affected by the watermark. Some
minutiae would affected in this experiment, however, 12 matched minutiae points
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are enough to determine that both fingerprint samples are derived from the same
finger [12]. Minutiae points represent the local ridge features that appear either
at a ridge ending or at ridge bifurcation. In order to obtain the total number
of minutia in each block, we apply a filter on the fingerprint image that results
after the binarization and thinning operation. Then, the total number of extracted
minutiae is determined. The applied filter obtains the number of one-value of each
3x3 window as follows:
1. The central pixel is ridge ending if the pixel value is 1 and has only 1 one-
value neighbor.
2. The central pixel is a bifurcation if the pixel value is 1 and has 3 one-value
neighbors.
3. The central pixel is normal pixel if the pixel value is 1 and has 2 one-value
neighbors.
6.4.3 Watermark Embedding
Once the target block is defined, watermark data are embedded into the fingerprint
image by modifying the DCT coefficients according to:
Cnew = Cold + (1× α Wi) (6.7)
where Cnew is the new DCT coefficient, Cold is the original DCT coefficient, Wi is
the modified DCT coefficients and α is the watermarking strength.
The inverse DCT reconstructs a sequence from its DCT coefficients and given
as:
Iw(xs, ys) =
M−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
CiCjD(i, j) cos
(
ipi
2xs + 1
2N
)
cos
(
jpi
2ys + 1
2N
)
(6.8)
6.5 Experimental Results
In watermarking algorithms, the embedded watermark can either cause missing of
minutiae in watermarked image or add false minutiae to the watermarked image.
As a result, the matching between the original and the watermarked images based
on minutiae points may significantly affected. In the proposed method, a fingerprint
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image is watermarked by embedding a hashed message. To examine the effect of
the watermark on the fingerprint minutiae, the original and watermarked images
were compared via a matching process based on the similarity of the extracted
minutiae. The proposed algorithm was tested on a dataset of 80 fingerprint images.
The implemented watermarking schema cause only slight influence on minutiae.
According to [25], in the fingerprint authentication system, 12 matching minutiae
points in two fingerprint images is sufficient to verify both images as belonging to
the same finger. Pankanti et al. in [25], have studied the matching probability for
two randomly selected fingerprint images in the database, concluding that there is
still the possibility for error in the minutiae-based matching method. However, the
error rate is low, and it is difficult to develop a completely error-free fingerprint-
based authentication system that relies solely on minutiae-based matching. Figure
6.6 shows the extracted minutiae in the original and watermarked images. It can
be seen that the watermarking has only a small effect on the colour image as it is
apparent that only few minutiae points are missed or added due to the watermarking
process and the matching between original and watermarked images with high
accuracy is still achieved.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.6: (a) Extracted minutiae in original and (d) extracted minutiae in
watermarked images.
The proposed watermarking schema is compared with the watermarking meth-
ods in [135; 136]. All the three watermarking share the same concept of watermark
embedding that is (i) the embedded message is constructed based on binary bits
(ii) the host image is a color image collected by a mobile camera and (iii) the DCT
technique is utilized to embed the watermark into the color image. However, the
host color image in our proposed method is a fingerprint image where in the two ex-
isting schemes is not. To make a fair comparison, the simulations of their methods
are implemented on the same color fingerprint images that are used in our method.
Afterwards, the degrees of similarity between the original and watermarked fin-
gerprint images are quantitatively determined using two different types of metrics
that are (i) pixel-based metrics and (ii) human visual system (HVS) metrics. The
PSNR, MSE and correlation measures are used to determine the pixel-based sim-
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ilarity where the SSIM and UIQI are used to compare the images based on HVS.
The simulation results of the achieved comparisons are presented in Table 6.1. The
proposed method has shown better values compared to the methods introduced in
[135; 136].
Table 6.1: The mean values of mean square error PSNR, MSE, correlation, UIQI
and SSIM
Method PSNR MSE Correlation SSIM UIQI
Proposed method 42.2 0.0083 0.992 0.996 0.995
AlGindy et al. [135] 28.6 1.31 0.899 0.910 0.902
Jeedella et al. [136] 23.2 1.25 0.853 0.879 0.898
The performance of the verification system was assessed based on similarity
matching scores and EER. The two fingerprint captures, which are from the same
person, were used to generate the ’genuine score’ and if they were from different
fingers, they were used to create the imposter score. The histogram in Figure 6.7
illustrates genuine and imposter similarity scores for both the original and water-
marked fingerprint images. Slight differences between watermarked and original
histograms are apparent, with the main problem being the boundary between the
imposter and genuine score distributions. Ideally, these distributions would be sep-
arated completely, but in reality the scores overlap. Hence, other measurements
such as EER, FMR, and FNMR were assessed for evaluation. Figure 6.8 shows sim-
ilarity graphs based on FMR and FNMR. The change in EER is slightly increased
by using normal DCT watermarking techniques for fingerprint images. The ROC
curves are shown in Figure 6.9. Although only a few minutiae are missing from
the watermarked images, the proposed watermarked method apparently has robust
performance as a verification system.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, integrating of multiple identifiers for both the fingerprint capturing
device and its owner into one unique entity using watermarking schema was devel-
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oped. Camera-based colour fingerprint images were discussed in detail in terms of
their segmentation, minutiae extraction and watermarking. Text-related informa-
tion about user and mobile device is hashed to produce a visible and collision-free
digest. This digest is embedded as watermark into the fingerprint image acquired
by user mobile device. In order to preserve fingerprint minutiae from being affected
by the embedded watermark, the watermark is embedded into DCT blocks that
contain two minutiae points or less. This entity coins the capturing device’s infor-
mation to the owner’s biometrics, which has the potential to be used as an index
for the privacy-preserved database and secure identity authentication.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.7: Histograms showing the distributions of genuine (right bars) and imposter
(left bars) similarity scores for (a) original fingerprint images and (b) watermarked images
using normal DCT, compared with original fingerprint images (c) from the proposed method.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.8: FMR vs. FNMR graph for (a) original fingerprint images, (b) normal DCT
watermarking and (c) watermarked images compared with original fingerprint images. The
FNMR is the point at which FMR and FNMR have the same error value.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 6.9: ROC curves for (a) original fingerprint images and (b) normal DCT water-
marked images, compared with (c) watermarked images using the proposed method.
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Summary and Final Conclusion
The main goal of this thesis was to develop an approach to verify the genuineness
of fingerprint images in fingerprint-based authentication systems. A watermark-
ing principle was used to ensure the fingerprint image authenticity of the claimed
person. Three watermarking schemas were developed to embed watermarks in fin-
gerprint images. In implementing these watermarking methods, different aspects
were considered:
1. The embedding of watermark into fingerprint images collected from different
angles without significantly affect minutiae.
2. The embedding of a high payload of multiple watermarks into fingerprint
images.
3. The robustness of the implemented watermarking schemas to most common
image operations.
4. To use the fingerprint watermarking concept to link mobile device and its
owner together to prevent fake fingerprint images being used to access the
mobile device.
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7.1 The Watermarking of Fingerprint Images Collected From Different
Angles
A new watermarking algorithm was proposed in Chapter 3 for embedding water-
marks into fingerprint images that are collected from different angles, using the
DTCWT technique. The aim was to preserve high percentage of fingerprint minu-
tiae from being by the embedded watermark in order to achieve a high level of
similarity between the fingerprint images. The influence of the embedded water-
mark was investigated. The results showed only few minutiae are affected due to
the watermark embedding process.
7.2 Embedding High Payloads of Watermark into Fingerprint Images
The proposed watermarking schema discussed in Chapter 4 was developed further
to increase the embedded watermark payload of fingerprint images. The method
was implemented to prevent the features of a fingerprint image used for identifica-
tion being affected by the embedded watermark. The approach takes advantage of
the benefits of both the DWT and DCT transforms to result in an efficient water-
marking method. User and mobile device identities were integrated into an owner’s
fingerprint image as multiple watermarks to prove the genuineness of the fingerprint
sample. A matching process based on minutiae was applied to watermarked and
original fingerprint images to investigate the effect of high payloads on minutiae.
Very promising matching results were achieved in this regard.
7.3 Robustness of Implemented Watermarking Methods to Common
Image Operations
The robustness of the presented watermarking algorithms in Chapter 3 and 4 to
common image operations was investigated in Chapter 5. The quality of wa-
termarked fingerprint images and the extracted watermarks was evaluated using
standard image quality metrics: PSNR, SSIM, UIQI and correlation. The results
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showed that the proposed algorithms were robust to most image processing oper-
ations including image compression, image translation, image resizing or scaling,
sharpening, rotation, cropping and salt-and-pepper noises.
7.4 Integrating Multiple Identification Factors in One Unique Entity
The watermarking schema presented in Chapter 6 was developed to integrate mul-
tiple identification factors for the mobile device and its owner into colour fingerprint
images to coin the identities into one unique entity. This unique entity has high
security strength, which could be used for both identity construction and authen-
tication. A DCT-based transformation was implemented to divide the fingerprint
image into 8× 8 blocks. The watermark is embedded into the blocks that contain
only two or less minutia points. The results obtained demonstrated the capability
of the developed watermarking schema to embed watermark into colour fingerprint
images without significantly affect minutiae points.
7.5 Future Work
This thesis has proposed a set of watermarking approaches to improve the effective-
ness of fingerprint-based authentication systems. Nevertheless, there are opportu-
nities to further improve on these approaches, and also to address other relevant
issues in the area of fingerprint-based authentication systems for mobile platforms
that have not been covered in the thesis. Based on the analyses carried out during
the current research, some of these issues are:
• The proposed method in Chapter 3 can be improved to work for realistic
fingerprint images. As a future improvement, the preprocessing stages will
be given greater consideration to create realistic (sensor-dependent) back-
grounds.
• The drawbacks of touch-based fingerprint sensors in mobile devices have been
investigated in this thesis. Although the new smart phones are equipped
with improved cameras capable of capturing high-quality touchless fingerprint
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images, this must be performed in a controlled environment if the images
are to be used for identification purposes. Further, fewer minutiae can be
extracted from touchless images compared to touch-based images. It is a
challenge to achieve reliable fingerprint matching based on a touchless image.
Therefore, reconstructing a 3-D model of a touchless fingerprint image based
on different 2-D images would improve the matching performance.
• Reconstructing a 3-D model of a touchless fingerprint image would improve
the quality and increase the number of extracted minutiae. However, it can-
not verify the genuineness of the fingerprint sample. Therefore, the embed-
ding of watermarks in 3-D models should be trialled in the future.
• A touchless fingerprint matching system would be a significant improvement
in fingerprint-based authentication on mobile platforms. Thus, watermarked
touchless fingerprint samples should be compared with original images to
verify the identity of the claimed person.
• The developed database of touchless fingerprint images can be improved using
a high quality mobile camera. Also, it can be classified based on the position
orientation of the finger.
• The watermarking algorithm for touchless images captured by mobile cameras
proposed in Chapter 6 is an attractive research area. However, there still
limitations in mobile resources that prevent the full implementation of such
an algorithm in mobile environments. Therefore, the algorithm proposed in
Chapter 6 needs to be improved to balance between the limitations of mobile
resources and robust watermarking requirements.
• Mobile infrastructure is beyond the work in this thesis. It suffers from a
shortage of resources, such as power, memory and capacity, compared to
computer-based resources. Fingerprint watermarking adds more authenti-
cation factors for authentication purposes to prevent fake fingerprints from
accessing system resources. However, with the current mobile platform lim-
itations, the proposed fingerprint watermarking has to be improved in the
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future to address the limitations of the resources in mobile devices.
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